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Mr. Liman.
Mr. North.
Mr. Sullivan.
Mr. Liman.
Mr. Sullivan.
[Y]ou are looking at a book there. What is the
book, sir?
The book is made up of notes that I have made
in trying to prepare with counsel for this
hearing.
Don't tell him what it includes.
Well, I think that if a witness is looking at
something that I, as counsel, am entitled to see
what he is refreshing his recollection with.
I think you are wrong. That is a product of
lawyers working with clients.
... That is none of your business .... 1
I. The Witness-Preparation Problem
A. Introduction
Witness preparation is any communication between a lawyer and a
prospective witness-client or non-client, friendly or hostile-that is in-
tended to improve the substance or presentation of testimony to be of-
fered at a trial or other hearing. Witness preparation enables lawyers to
present witnesses who are thoroughly familiar with the subject matter of
their testimony and who are prepared to say what they know in a clear,
coherent manner. 2 American litigators regularly use witness prepara-
1. Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Conm. To
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 237-38 (1987) [hereinafter
Iran-Contra Hearings] (testimony of Oliver L. North).
2. See, e.g., R. ARON & J. ROSNER, HOW TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL 82 (1985)
(describing witness preparation as "the most important aspect of trial advocacy"); id. at 309-10 (not-
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tion, and virtually all would, upon reflection, consider it a fundamental
duty of representation and a basic element of effective advocacy.
At the same time, for many other lawyers and most nonlawyers,
witness preparation represents the worst qualities of the legal system.3
Because witness preparation is ordinarily conducted in private, it is diffi-
cult for the lawyer and witness to avoid the appearance that they have
invented a convenient story for the jury. In fact, the temptation to invent
or embellish a story can be very strong.4 Moreover, the line between
preparing and prompting (or "coaching," the usual term of opprobrium)
is rarely clear even for the most scrupulous. Even though witness prepa-
ration occurs in practically every lawsuit, it is almost never taught in law
school, not directly regulated, seldom discussed in scholarly literature,
and rarely litigated. Witness preparation is treated as one of the dark
secrets of the legal profession. The resulting lack of rules, guidelines, and
scholarship has created significant uncertainty about the permissible
types and methods of witness preparation.
Ten years ago, the District of Columbia Bar, in an attempt to elimi-
nate some of this uncertainty, issued an ethics opinion concerning the
appropriate role of lawyers in preparing witnesses. 5 The opinion asserted
that detailed, substantive consultations between lawyers and prospective
witnesses are an expected part of trial preparation. Furthermore, it con-
cluded that a lawyer's suggesting actual language to be used by a witness
may be appropriate, as long as the ultimate testimony remains truthful
and is not misleading.6 An editorial in the National Law Journal praised
ing that 74 percent of the lawyers in their survey believed witness preparation was a duty); Berg,
Preparing Witnesses, 13 LITIGATION 13, 15 (1987) ("The first rule, then, is to woodshed in every
instance, rehearsing both direct and cross-examination."). There is even an "Idora Silver & Associ-
ates School of Witness Preparation." See Thimmesch, Evaluating Witness Performance During Pre-
trial Preparation, THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, Oct. 1989, at 31, 32-33.
3. "The interviewing and preparation of witnesses ... is a practice that, more than almost
anything else, gives trial lawyers their reputation as purveyors of falsehoods." D. LUaAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 96 (1988). One practitioner feels obligated to remind readers
that "there is nothing dirty about witness preparation." J. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES
AND TACTICS § 9.04, at 315 (1982); see also Kornblum, The Oral Civil Deposition: Preparation and
Examination of Witnesses, THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, May 1971, at 11, 12 ("Some inexperienced
lawyers feel it is improper to ask a witness who is not a client to confer with them about the case, but
there is no basis for any apprehension ....").
4. Cf. Berg, supra note 2, at 13 ("It is in the privacy of our offices, preparing parties and
witnesses to testify under oath, that we can affect the integrity of the judicial system."); Stark, Teg-
eler & Channels, The Effect of Student Values on Lawyering Performance: An Empirical Response to
Professor Condlin, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409, 410 (1987) (describing witness preparation as an ethical
litmus test).
5. See District of Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. No. 79 (1979) [hereinafter Op. No.
79] (copy on file with The Texas Law Review).
6. See id. The question presented to the committee sought advice on the proper level of attor-
ney involvement in preparing written direct testimony for regulatory proceedings. The committee.
however, took a far broader approach. See id.
279
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Opinion No. 79 for "affirm[ing] the real-world practices most lawyers
follow." '7 But the editorial criticized the opinion's failure to give lawyers
clear guidance for preparing witnesses: "What bothers us, however, is
how little lawyers are told about the do's and don'ts of witness prepara-
tion .... There is a need for specific guidelines."' 8 It is a measure of the
uncertainty dominating witness preparation that Opinion No. 79 remains
the only authoritative source that even attempts to discuss the subject
comprehensively.
The doctrinal uncertainties in witness preparation often result in
misunderstandings in the application of legal rules to particular witness-
preparation practices. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ,9 the
court took the unusual step of allowing nondisclosure of work-product
material used in witness preparation even though the court believed that
the lawyer had clearly waived any privilege that protected the material
from disclosure.10 Judge Frankel explained:
[G]iven the current development of the law in this quarter, it seems
fair to say that counsel were not vividly aware of the potential for a
stark choice between withholding the notebooks from the experts
or turning them' over to opposing counsel.' I
Judge Frankel ruled prospectively that disclosure would ordinarily be
required.'
Practitioners themselves are partially responsible for the lack of
rules and guidelines. Faced with the considerable inconveniences of con-
ducting their own witness preparation in public, lawyers seem satisfied to
leave each other's preparation alone. t2 Without litigation, there is little
judicial authority on the subject. This uncertain state of affairs is perpet-
7. "Prepping" the Witness, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Frankel, J.).
10. See id. at 616-17.
11. Id. at 617. Professor Saltzburg has also recognized this uncertainty. See Saltzburg, Law-
yers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 650, 687 (1986) (asserting that
development of acceptable standards of behavior is difficult because the legal community has been
unable to clearly identify the premises of the adversarial system).
12. One is tempted to postulate that there is a tacit understanding among civil trial lawyers that
they will not look too deeply into each other's witness preparation. The practical literature makes
clear that preparation activities are ordinarily left untouched by discovery. See, e.g., Frampton,
Some Practical and Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 MD. L. REV. 5, 33 (1976)
(noting that witness preparation is "customarily ... a one-on-one process"); Herndon & Karl, Dem-
onstration: Preparation of a Witness to Testify, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 140 (1978) (stating that the
prosecution did not inquire into the defendant's witness preparation); see also United States v. Jones.
542 F.2d 186, 208-10 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that ordinarily counsel will want to and is entitled to
interview nonclient witnesses privately); R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 357-58 (implying
that lawyers are not concerned about discovery of witness preparation unless they keep a written
record of the interview). Moreover, most trial manuals do not include detailed questioning about
witness preparation in basic deposition outlines or checklists, a striking omission because prepara-
tion is at the heart of the suggested questioning of expert witnesses. Compare S. BALDWIN. F. H.\RE"
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uated because most lawyers would rather tolerate doctrinal uncertainty
than risk litigation.
Witness preparation is also permeated by ethical uncertainty. It
presents one of the most difficult ethical dilemmas regularly encountered
by lawyers. The previously quoted exchange from the Iran-Contra Hear-
ings of three summers ago is part of a rare public appearance of witness
preparation. It displays in high relief the tension between Mr. Sullivan's
confidential relationship with his client and Mr. Liman's thorough fac-
tual investigation, both of which represent fundamental aspects of the
adversary system. Any attempt to eliminate the doctrinal uncertainty
that dominates the area of witness preparation must fully consider the
competing goals of partisan representation and truth seeking that are
present in the adversarial system of justice.
This Article attempts to fill the need for a comprehensive picture of
the doctrinal and ethical problems of witness preparation in civil litiga-
tion.13 In addition, the Article develops a framework for resolving dis-
putes arising out of this problematic component of the American justice
system. The Article approaches the problem in four stages.
Part I illustrates the basic problems and tensions in this area, using
examples from the Iran-Contra Hearings. Part II discusses current wit-
ness preparation practices through an analysis of the types of witnesses a
lawyer prepares and the various techniques a lawyer employs to develop
witness testimony. The Article describes the various rules and doctrines
that govern this area of trial preparation, demonstrating the complexity
and uncertainty of the law in this area. 14
& F. McGOVERN, THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE 575-80 (1981) [hereinafter
S. BALDWIN] (checklist for deposing plaintiff) with id. at 401-14 (checklist for deposing an expert).
My own experience in practice tends to confirm the suggestion that trial lawyers have a tacit
understanding that preparation activities are protected. Experienced litigators prepare witnesses
with little apparent thought of waiver problems. Instead, they simply instruct witnesses not to an-
swer substantive questions about their preparation beyond the fact that it occurred.
13. The most thorough aUnd explicit treatments of witness preparation are found in the immense
body of literature directed toward practitioners and usually written by practitioners. The best of the
practical literature is helpful, informative, and sensitive to the complex legal and ethical issues that
witness preparation presents. See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
PREPARING AND PRESENTING THE CASE 357-58 (1981). More typically, however, this literature
tends to resolve complexity or ambiguity with conclusory advice. See, e.g., Kornblum, supra note 3,
at 12; McElhaney, Horse-Shedding the Witness, TRIAL, Oct. 1987, at 80, 84. In addition, the litera-
ture is often unrealistically confident that honest lawyers will instinctively be able to find the way
through this tangled forest. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 2, at 58; Summit, The Witness Needs Help, in
THi. LITIGATION MANUAL, at 497, 500 (J. Koeltl 2d ed. 1989). A more troubling phenomenon is a
win-at-all-costs perspective that encourages-in more or less badly disguised ways-plainly unethi-
cal practices. The academic literature, in contrast, focuses on important parts of the witness prepa-
ration problem-the psychology of perception, adversarial roles, ethical duties, and evidentiary
rules-but leaves the forest for practitioners to describe.
14. Uncertainty exists in part because doctrinal analysis of witness preparation is commonly
thought to involve only one legal rule-the lawyer's ethical duty not to present or participate in the
281
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Part III shows that witness preparation sits squarely astride two
very different conceptions of the adversary system itself and of the roles
of lawyers within it. The basic structure of adversarial justice necessi-
tates witness preparation, but witness preparation can also have a dis-
torting effect on the accuracy of testimony. The possibility of distortion
interferes with the judicial system's attempt to reach the truth. The doc-
trinal ambivalence and resulting uncertainty described in Part II, there-
fore, are ultimately understood as manifestations of a deeper conflict
within the adversary system itself.
The Article suggests in Part IV that the best way to cope with wit-
ness preparation is to recognize the awkward position it holds in the ad-
versary system and to address the problem directly in witness-
preparation disputes. Because witness preparation can undermine the
important truth-seeking function of trials, it should not be encouraged
without qualification. This Article suggests that the appropriateness of
any witness-preparation technique should depend on whether the struc-
ture of the adversary system requires such a technique in the particular
context in which it is employed.
B. An Illustration: The Iran-Contra Hearings
Witness preparation poses serious difficulties for litigators trying to
steer an appropriate course between their duties to their clients and their
duties to the tribunal and to the judicial system as a whole. The recent
congressional hearings concerning- America's support of rebel forces in
Nicaragua with profits diverted from the sale of arms to Iran, the so-
called Iran-Contra Affair, provide a rare opportunity to explore this di-
lemma in a concrete setting.' 5
creation of false evidence. See, e.g., Op. No. 79, supra note 5 ("[A] lawyer may not prepare, or assist
in preparing, testimony that he or she knows, or ought to know, is false or misleading."); M. FREED-
MAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59-77 (1975) (discussing the problem of giving
advice that might induce the client to commit perjury); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 648
(1986) ("[A] lawyer may not assist ... a witness in twisting or distorting... the truth .... "). In
fact, many legal rules apply, as Part II of the Article demonstrates.
15. A congressional hearing is not, of course, the ideal setting in which to discuss the legal rules
that govern civil trials. A congressional hearing does not consist of two adverse parties presenting a
case to a genuinely neutral tribunal. Also, the procedural and evidentiary rules governing a congres-
sional proceeding differ significantly from those used in a civil trial. Therefore, the analogy must be
treated with some diffidence.
Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, the similarities outweigh the differences. The Iran-Con-
tra Hearings had criminal implications, and the tone set by Liman and Sullivan was unmistakably
adversarial. True, the statements of Colonel North in the Hearings could not be used against him in
any criminal proceedings because he received a grant of immunity in exchange for his testimony.
Yet North and Sullivan were attempting to make a favorable impression on the public. Unlike other
witnesses in other congressional hearings, North's testimony was not scripted or reviewed before the
hearing; therefore, North did not know with certainty what areas the committee would explore or
282
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The hub of this intrigue was a previously little-known member of
the National Security Council staff, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North.
Between the public disclosure of the diversion of funds on November 25,
1986, and North's congressional testimony in early July of 1987, North
was dismissed from his White House position, an independent counsel
commenced a criminal investigation into the activities of North and
others, North retained Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., as his own counsel, and
North asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in response to a request that he testify before the special House and Sen-
ate committees investigating the Iran-Contra matter. For their part, the
committees hired experienced litigators, Arthur L. Liman for the Senate
and John W. Nields, Jr., for the House, to manage the investigation.
Congress subsequently granted immunity to North in exchange for his
testimony at the hearings.
The public eagerly awaited North's appearance before the commit-
tees, and the predicted fireworks began promptly at the outset of North's
testimony. Sullivan opened by complaining to the Senate chairman, Sen-
ator Daniel K. Inouye, that he had been unable to prepare North ade-
quately for his testimony because the committee failed to provide many
documents until a few days before the hearing. t6 Most viewers, sharing
the common belief that an honest witness simply takes an oath and testi-
fies, were probably surprised to hear Sullivan say that North "cannot be
expected to accurately recall all of the facts" or to give "complete and
accurate testimony" without extensive consultations with counsel.' 7 In
fact, Sullivan was absolutely correct. A witness cannot accurately testify
about matters "related to years of intensive work" without extensive wit-
ness preparation including the review, with counsel, of all "the relevant
what specific questions would be asked. Moreover, as an arbiter of conflicts between Liman and
Sullivan, Chairman Daniel Inouye played a procedural role resembling that of a judge.
In addition, while Congress is not bound by judicial rules of evidence or common-law privileges
that govern trials, it has generally sought to avoid tests of privilege and in practice respects these
rules and privileges. See Millet, The Applicability of Evidentiary Privileges for Confidential Commu-
nications Before Congress, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 311-12, 317 (1988). Most importantly, the
exchange between Liman and Sullivan was a debate between lawyers to a tribunal of lawyers. The
rhetoric and thought processes of all the active participants were those commonly employed by
lawyers in the courtroom. During the lengthy debate about privilege, no one suggested that congres-
sional rules were different from those applied in civil trials.
This Article relies exclusively on public knowledge of the Iran-Contra investigation. Therefore,
any assumptions about the actors' motives or their prehearing activities are inferences only and
should be considered strictly hypothetical.
16. Sullivan's complaints were apparently somewhat disingenuous. Chairman Inouye pointed
out that Sullivan himself had proposed a simultaneous exchange of documents five days before the
hearing. In addition, it was Sullivan who had requested the July 7 starting date, despite the commit-
tee's desire to begin later. See Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-5.
17. Id. at 4.
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materials well in advance."' 8 There is no reason to doubt Sullivan's
claim that this was the first time he had ever represented a client without
being able to review all the relevant documents well in advance of the
hearing. 19
The committees' attention returned to witness preparation two days
later. During questioning by chief Senate counsel Liman concerning
events of the previous year, North consulted Sullivan before answering, a
frequent occurrence throughout North's testimony. North and Sullivan
then selected a black loose-leaf binder in front of them on the witness
table, opened it, and perused a document inside it. The following ensued:
Mr. Liman. [Y]ou are looking at a book there. What is the
book, sir?
Mr. North. The book is made up of notes that I have made in
trying to prepare with counsel for this hearing.
And I have been asked questions that covered 5-1/
years of work, many of the days in which were
non-stop. I am trying to give you honest, straight-
forward and factual and complete answers.20
Under the rules of evidence, opposing counsel is entitled to review any
writing used by a witness during testimony to refresh recollection, so that
counsel can test the existence, certainty, and accuracy of the witness's
memory.21 Liman continued:
Mr. Liman. And-
Mr. North. It includes-
Mr. Sullivan. Don't tell him what it includes.
Mr. Liman. Well, I think that if a witness is looking at some-
thing that I, as counsel, am entitled to see what he
is refreshing his recollection with.
Mr. Sullivan. I think you are wrong. That is a product of law-
yers working with clients.
Mr. Liman. And you think that a witness is entitled to read
something and that we are not entitled to see what
he is reading?
Mr. Sullivan. He is entitled to read his notes and preserve the
attorney-client privilege. Everything in that book
is a product of the attorney-client, and the work-
product privilege, Mr. Liman, and you know
that. 22
Sullivan had quickly capitalized on North's legally adroit characteriza-
tion of the contents of the notebook as the product of "trying to prepare
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 237-38.
21. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
22. See Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 1, at 238.
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with counsel." This characterization-itself undoubtedly the result of
careful preparation by Sullivan-laid the foundation for Sullivan to claim
that the document itself might have been privileged because it reflected
either communications between lawyer and client or the thoughts and
impressions of the lawyer regarding the conduct of the case. The note-
books also probably contained a collection of some, but not all, of the
documents23 provided to North by the committees. Sullivan, in consulta-
tion with North, had deemed these documents relevant and important.
The process of selection, therefore, constituted protected work product.24
Liman countered that North had waived those privileges by relying
on the documents.2 5 Liman then attempted to establish the foundational
requirements for disclosure of materials used to refresh recollection.
Mr. Liman. Are you [North] able to recall your conversation
with Admiral Poindexter on the 21st about the
diversion without looking at that book?26
But Sullivan-apparently concerned that he had permitted North to
waive the secrecy of the notebooks by consulting them in formulating an
answer-intervened and flatly refused to let North answer any further
questions.
Mr. Sullivan. That is none of your business either. You just ask
him the question.
... get off his back.
Mr. North. Counsel [Liman], I would-
Mr. Sullivan. Don't answer the question. Next question. The
question, Mr. Chairman, won't be answered. 27
Senator Inouye did not intervene, and Liman did not ask him to inter-
vene.2 8 Instead, Liman moved on to other questions, and apparently no
one pursued the matter any further. Shortly afterwards, however, Chair-
man Inouye ordered disclosure of similar material under somewhat dif-
ferent circumstances. 29
23. All the documents provided by the committee comprised a pile taller than North. Id. at 4.
Any documents provided by North himself would have enlarged that stack. It did not appear from
news photographs that North had that many binders with him.
24. See James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982).
25. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975) (discussing waiver by testimonial
use of privileged materials); FED. R. EVID. 612(1) (providing for disclosure of documents used by a
witness to refresh recollection while testifying).
26. Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 1, at 238.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 238-39.
29. Liman had asked North to consult one of the notebooks. Sullivan objected, at length, that
only the witness could decide whether to consult his notes to refresh his memory. Senator Inouye
decided that Liman's question was proper, but he let North and Sullivan choose whether to use the
285
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Three aspects of the Liman-Sullivan exchange are worth noting.
First, a highly competent and experienced criminal defense lawyer like
Sullivan allowed his client to risk waiving the secrecy of witness prepara-
tion. Second, an equally competent and experienced litigator like Liman
failed to seize the opportunity, letting Sullivan, in effect, get away with
this mistake. It seems clear that Sullivan genuinely believed that his
preparation with North was "none of [Liman's] business" and that Li-
man did not on the whole disagree. Third, and perhaps as a result, their
disagreement was inconclusive. This brief altercation between Sullivan
and Liman illustrates the doctrinal complexity and uncertainty that sur-
rounds witness preparation. Part II details the problems lawyers fre-
quently encounter when preparing witnesses and discusses the various
rules that govern this aspect of a lawyer's duties.
II. Witness Preparation in Practice
There are two legally significant characteristics of a given witness-
preparation situation: the role of the witness 30 and the witness-prepara-
tion technique. 31 The role of the witness determines the application of
privileges and ethical duties. The preparation technique implicates pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules. This Article pairs witness roles and prepa-
ration techniques with particular ethical standards and legal rules to
illustrate the complex considerations involved in witness preparation.
This pairing is merely for convenience and clarity. Plainly, each witness
role and each preparation technique would actually implicate several dif-
ferent legal and ethical considerations.
A. Witness Roles
1. Clients: Lawyer Competence and Zealousness.-Litigators must
be competent to handle their clients' cases. Lawyers are ethically re-
quired to prepare adequately32 and to represent their clients "zealously
within the bounds of the law."' 33 The American Bar Association's Model
notes. See Iran-Contra Hearings, gupra note 1, at 239-40. A few minutes later, Sullivan again raised
the witness-preparation objection to another of Liman's questions. Chairman Inouye supported Li-
man in his insistence on a response, and North answered the question. See id. at 240-41. When
North claimed not to recall what he had reviewed, however, he was not asked to produce his notes
or notebooks of documents. See id.
30. See infra notes 32-94 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 95-242 and accompanying text. A third characteristic, testimonial setting, is
occasionally important (though to a much lesser extent), because the rules of evidence were designed
for trials as opposed to pretrial testimony. Preparing witnesses for deposition and preparing wit-
nesses ror trial, however, are generally viewed as equally important, and the same practices apply.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1981).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1989) (requiring that a lawyer not
286
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Code of Professional Responsibility does not speak explicitly of witness
preparation, but it makes clear that factual preparation of the case is
essential. In the context of professional competence, the Code directs
lawyers to undertake representation only with "preparation adequate in
the circumstances. ' 34 A similar requirement in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that attorneys make a reasonable investigation of the
facts alleged in their pleadings.35 This task normally includes reviewing
with the client the matters to be covered, anticipating specific questions
that may be asked on direct or cross-examination, and reviewing impor-
tant documents to familiarize or refamiliarize the client with them.
The obligation to prepare adequately does not end with the prepara-
tion of the client who testifies. A full investigation of the facts is part of a
lawyer's duty to a client.36 The lawyer must contact and prepare other
witnesses. Judge Keeton explains:
[I]f you prepare your case properly you will not call a witness to
the stand without having asked the witness what his testimony will
be on all points as to which you can anticipate he may be
questioned. 37
The practical literature uniformly views the failure to interview witnesses
prior to testimony as a combination of strategic lunacy and gross negli-
bring frivolous claims); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981); see also
id., DR 7-101 (requiring that a lawyer "seek the lawful objectives of [the] client through reasonably
available means permitted by law").
34. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1989) (requiring "thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1981); see also id. EC 7-19 (addressing the importance of zealous
preparation). In practice, however, this standard may mean little more than not neglecting the case.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974) (indicating that
an attorney violates DR 6-101(A)(2) only when the conduct involves a "'conscious disregard for the
responsibility owed to [the] client"); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1273 (1973) (noting that "[n]eglect cannot be found if the acts or omissions com-
plained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of judgment made in good faith"); Gaudineer,
Ethics antd Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 88, 98-99 (1976) (advocating wider use of DR 6-101 to
discipline failure to prepare adequately). Malpractice is another way of enforcing this obligation, see
id. at 108-10, but tort law does not provide any more specific guidance than the ethical rules. See id.
at 107 (stating that malpractice liability arises when a lawyer "fails to exercise that degree of care,
skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and pru-
dent lawyer").
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g). See generally Legal Ethics: Rule 11 Sanctions: Reasonable
Inquiry, 1987 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 373, 377-91.
36. Lawyers' need to investigate their cases thoroughly serves as one justification for the attor-
ney-client and work-product privileges. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91
(1981); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). By preserving the confidences of the
client, the lawyer can be fully informed of all facts of the case so that the client can "'obtain the full
advantage of our legal system." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981).
37. R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 136 (2d ed. 1973); accord, Op. No. 79, supra
note 5 (noting that part of a lawyer's job is to prepare witnesses); see also Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango
Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 20 F.R.D. 181, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (recognizing the need for pretrial confer-
ences with witnesses).
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gence. 38 A lawyer who does not prepare all witnesses is "derelict in his
professional duties."' 39
The case law detailing the sixth amendment right to effective assist-
ance of counsel provides additional insight into the need for effective
preparation. 40 Criminal representation may be ineffective if the lawyer
fails to make adequate investigation into the facts of the case.41 The
Supreme Court has held that legal assistance is ineffective if counsel is
not given a reasonable amount of time to prepare for trial.42 A client's
right to effective assistance of counsel also includes conferences with
counsel before and during the trial. The Court has expressly recognized
that these conferences can involve witness preparation. 43
There is another dimension to client preparation. Even if the client-
witness is not a party, the lawyer must represent the client as a witness.
Some prior conferences are almost always necessary, 44 if only to help
calm and relax the witness. 45 Whether or not a witness has a stake in the
38. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 2, at 14 (remarking that "it is probably unethical to fail to pre-
pare a witness").
39. A. LEVIN & H. CRAMER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL ADVOCACY 29 (1968).
40. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the need for "the guiding hand of counsel
at every step of the proceedings," Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), because legal skill is
crucial even in apparently simple cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
This principle is equally true in civil and criminal matters. The only differences are the higher stakes
of criminal prosecutions and the criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 4-4.1, 4-4.3(a), (d) (1982).
42. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 53. But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 660-62 (1984)
(limiting presumption of ineffective assistance to extreme cases in which counsel was not given any
opportunity to prepare).
43. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-91 (1976); see also Crutchfield v. Wainwright,
803 F.2d 1103, 1119 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Crutchfield v. Dugger, 483 U.S. 1008
(1987) (Edmondson, J., concurring) ("[T]here is nothing unethical or, otherwise, wrong with lawyers
counseling their clients at every recess concerning the anticipated direction of the prosecutor's ques-
tions and the best manner in which the client can present the facts most favorably to the defense. To
the contrary, such counseling is entirely proper."); United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641, 645 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[W]e hold that depriving a criminal defendant of'the right to consult with counsel
during court recesses-regardless of how brief the recesses may be-violates the constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel."). But see Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 601 (1989) (holding that
a witness has no right to meet with counsel during a brief recess between defendant's direct examina-
tion and plaintiff's cross-examination); People v. Pendleton, 75 Il1. App. 3d 580, 595, 394 N.E.2d
496, 507 (1979) (disapproving of a prosecutor's discussions with a prosecution witness during a
weekend recess).
44. See Parnell, The Effective Use of Corporate Witnesses, THE BRIEF, Spring 1988, at 53, 55;
Summit, supra note 13, at 497.
45. See, e.g., Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that "a few soothing
words from counsel to the agitated or nervous defendant facing the awesome power of the state
might increase the likelihood that the defendant will state the truth on cross-examination"); Thomp-
son v. State, 507 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1987) (holding that denying the defendant the opportunity
to consult with counsel during a recess from cross-examination was unconstitutional because the
denial left the defendant "nervous, confused, and may have contributed to his performance on cross-
examination"); People v. McGuirk, 106 Ill. App. 2d 266, 276, 245 N.E.2d 917, 922, cert. denied, 396
U.S. 972 (1969) ("It is particularly advisable in a sex case to prepare a prosecutrix for the ordeal she
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outcome of the case, a lawyer should protect the witness from appearing
unnecessarily dishonest, venal, incompetent, graceless, or unintelligent.
Consider North's position in the Iran-Contra hearings. Immunity
shielded him from prosecution for what he told the committees, but he
had an extremely strong interest in making a favorable impression.46
Sullivan was responsible, in some part, for helping North achieve that
goal.
The obligation to prepare, in sum, is clear from the duties of compe-
tence and zealousness, however, the extent of that obligation is not clear.
"Within the bounds of the law" inevitably pulls the lawyer in the oppo-
site direction. 47 The greatest uncertainty in this respect exists when
preparation may encourage a client to commit perjury.48
2. Friendly Witnesses: The Scope of the Attorney-Client and Work-
Product Privileges.-In a case of any complexity, a lawyer ordinarily re-
lies on a cadre of friendly witnesses, including the client, to build the
case. To present the case in a clear, persuasive, and organized manner,
the lawyer must discuss with these witnesses the theory of the case and
the witnesses' roles in it, including how the testimony of each relates to
the testimony of others.49 For this preparation to be most effective, the
lawyer must be candid with the witnesses about the strengths and weak-
nesses of the case, the areas to emphasize and to avoid, and the vulnera-
bilities of the opponents. 50 Such candor requires that these preparation
activities be accorded some degree of privacy.51
will face in the courtroom."); see also Follingstad, Preparing the Witness for Courtroom Testimony,
TRIAL, Jan. 1984, at 50, 50 (describing how to present a more attractive witness by alleviating the
witness's anxiety).
46. The Senate recently voted to restore North's pension, which had been suspended following
his conviction for crimes arising out of his Iran-Contra activities. Rasky, After Sharp Debate, Senate
Votes to Let North Collect His Pension, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
47. The tension between zealousness and "the bounds of the law," apparent on the face of the
standard, is the locus of much of the ethical debate on witness preparation. See infra section
III(C)(2). Professor Hazard has said that a lawyer "must be mindful that measures not prohibited in
aid of a client are approximately obligatory, for failure to use'them is a failure of 'zeal.' If there
remains an ethically autonomous course for the conscientious lawyer, it lies between Scylla and
Charybdis." G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 42 (1978); accord, Luban, The Adver-
sary System Excuse, THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 89 (D. Luban ed. 1984). Luban disagrees profoundly
that the lawyer should be obliged to take every step short of the unethical or illegal; "within the
bounds of the law," he contends, should not mean "to the limit of the law and then a bit further."
Id.
48. See infra notes 110-129 and accompanying text.
49. See R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 58, 389-90; J. JEANS, LITIGATION §§ 5.15-.16
(1986); Parnell, supra note 44.
50. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947)).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 208-10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922
(1976) (recognizing that under normal circumstances the defense lawyer is entitled to interview wit-
nesses in private if the witnesses are willing).
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The attorney-client privilege provides nearly absolute protection
from disclosure for confidential communications between an attorney
and a client for the purpose of securing legal advice.52 The privilege's
guarantee of secrecy is intended to promote full and frank disclosure of
facts by the client to the lawyer, so that the lawyer can be adequately
prepared. 53 It protects only the communication and not the underlying
facts, 54 and it does not protect communications used to further crime or
fraud. 55
The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications be-
tween the client and the client's attorney.5 6 The attorney work-product
privilege, judicially established in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor,57 also pro-
tects an attorney's discussions with non-clients. The work-product privi-
52. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981). See generally E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (3d ed. 1984) (outlining the background and policy of the attor-
ney-client privilege); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2292 (1961) (tracing the historical origins
and policy rationale for the attorney-client privilege). Logically, the privilege should apply only to
factual communications from the client to the lawyer. In practice this distinction is difficult to
maintain, because much communication from the lawyer to the client reveals privileged client com-
munications. See E. CLEARY, supra, at § 89; see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE q 503(b)[03] (discussing generally the history, policy, and statutory definitions of the
attorney-client privilege).
53. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; E. CLEARY, supra note 52, § 87, at 205. Whether the privilege
encourages frank disclosure by the client and whether such disclosure is an adequate justification for
the privilege are hotly debated. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege
Retained, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 73-75 (1982) (defending the attorney-client privilege against
Judge Frankel's critique); Alschuler, The Preservation of Client's Confidences, 52 U. COLO. L. REV.
349, 350-53 (1981) (arguing that in addition to improving information flow, the attorney-client privi-
lege promotes a feeling that our legal system is fair); Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More
Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 61 (1982) (asserting that even in a profession
addicted to myths and fictions, the popular rationale for the attorney-client privilege is "too flimsy to
last").
54. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
55. See United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2626 (1989); see, e.g., Clark v. United States,
289 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1933) (reviewing the history of the attorney-client privilege and concluding that
"[t]he privilege takes flight" if used to commit a fraud); United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070,
1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming that "[a] conversation will not be cloaked with privilege when it is for
the purpose of committing a crime"); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir.
1975) (concluding that "[i]t is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to
communications regarding an intended crime"); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 2298, at 572 (as-
serting that "[i]t has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the
client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise").
56. In cases of joint defense arrangements, there may be an exception to this principle. See
MODEl. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment (1989) (noting that the attorney-
client privilege generally does not attach between commonly represented clients).
57. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). This Article refers to both the attorney-client and the work-product
protections as privileges. It has been traditional not to confer that dignity on the work-product
doctrine. See Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 943
(1983). The Supreme Court, however, recently abandoned its practice of not referring to work prod-
uct as a privilege and called it a "qualified privilege." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38
(1975). Professor Marcus applauds this change, arguing that the analytical distinction between the
two has broken down. See Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1605, 1624 (1986).
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lege is based on the structure of the adversary system,58 and it broadly
protects pretrial preparation:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to
work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the
rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties,
however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and
their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that
he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference. 59
Thus "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and in-
tangible" things are accorded protection from disclosure. 60  The Hick-
man Court expressly viewed the work-product privilege as a bulwark
against unethical trial preparation practices-such as stripping files and
placing misleading memoranda in files-by rendering them
unnecessary. 61
As codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the work-
product privilege protects most trial preparation materials ("ordinary"
work product) from disclosure unless an opposing party demonstrates a
"substantial need" for it.62 "Core" work product-"the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other rep-
resentative of a party concerning the litigation" 63-is afforded virtually
absolute protection. 64
58. Justice Jackson, concurring in Hickman, explained: "[A] common law trial is and always
should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to
perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." Hickman, 329
U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
59. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
60. See id. at 511.
61. See id.; Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
412, 426 (1983); see also Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks: Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14
VAND. L. REV. 865, 869 (1961) (explaining that the Court viewed the work-product privilege as a
protection against "sharp practices"); Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client Privi-
lege (pt. 2), 42 U. DET. L.J. 253, 269 (1964) ("Interference at the pretrial stage... would place a
premium upon 'sharp practices' since denials of the existence of such collected evidence might tend
to go undiscovered.").
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Codification is only partial, because by its terms Rule
26(b)(3) only applies to "documents and other tangible things ... prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for [a] party or ... that ... party's representative," id., whereas Hickman
applies to intangible work product as well. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. Presumably, Hickman
continues to apply to intangible work product such as oral communications from a lawyer to a client
that are not otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Clermont, Surveying Work
Product, 68 CORNELl. L. REv. 755, 757-58 (1983).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
64. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court declined to hold that core work product could never be
disclosed, but it did not suggest any circumstances under which disclosure might be appropriate. See
291
Texas Law Review
The attorney-client and work-product privileges perform comple-
mentary functions in trial preparation. The attorney-client privilege pro-
tects most of the preparation activities directly involving the client; the
work-product privilege protects the lawyer's own efforts, including re-
search, investigation, and contacts with other witnesses. Upjohn Co. v.
United States65 is illustrative:
The notes and memoranda sought by the Government here, how-
ever, are work product based on oral statements. If they reveal
communications, they are, in this case, protected by the attorney-
client privilege. To the extent that they do not reveal communica-
tions, they reveal the attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the
communications. 66
Indeed, it may be debated how different the attorney-client and work-
product privileges really are. One commentator believes that the two are
merging in the Supreme Court's thinking: "Blending the two privileges
also reflects reality, because a great deal of potentially discoverable mate-
rial falls within both. As a functional matter, then, what the Court may
be doing is ensuring a zone of silence for effective and ethical preparation
of cases."' 67 The synthesis of the two doctrines makes sense in the con-
text of witness preparation. On work-product and attorney-client
grounds, 68 courts regularly refuse to compel disclosure of trial prepara-
tion activities with witnesses.69 Courts have also objected to deposition
questioning designed "to elicit from the witness the specific questions
that counsel posed to him, or even the area of the case to which he di-
rected the majority of his questions. 70
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981). The Supreme Court has never permitted
discovery of core work product in the absence of waiver, see 3 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 52, 612[04], at 612-45, and some circuits have held that the protection is absolute. See
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retordierie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); see
also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that the need to
impeach a witness's statement would require disclosure of ordinary but not core work product).
65. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
66. Id. at 401.
67. Marcus, supra note 57, at 1624. But see Cohn, supra note 57 ("[T]he work-product protec-
tion is just that: a protection. It has not yet been fully elevated to the status of a privilege.").
68. See International Business Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-44 (2d Cir. 1975); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Rosenbaum, 401 F. Supp. 807,
808 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
69. See In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also Giordani v. Hoff-
mann, 278 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (refusing to find that "information regarding the
actions which transpired in preparing for a deposition have any relationship to the merits"); Bercow
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 39 F.R.D. 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (refusing to require witness to reveal
to questioner the people with whom he had met and the documents he had reviewed in preparation
for a deposition).
70. Ford v. Philips Elecs. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Phoe-
nix Nat'l Corp. v. Bowater United Kingdom Paper Ltd., 98 F.R.D. 669, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (not-
ing that " 'insofar as defendant's question attempted to elicit from the witness specific questions that
292
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3. Hostile Witnesses: Disclosure of Strategy and Waiver of Privi-
leges.-Adequate preparation for trial includes not only preparing the
client and friendly witnesses, but also interviewing adverse witnesses to
learn the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent's case and if possible
to neutralize adverse testimony.71 Such interviews enhance the entire
fact-finding process. By speaking with an adverse witness outside a for-
mal deposition setting, a lawyer may be able to suggest that the witness's
memory is inaccurate or that the events were not as clear as the opponent
claims. The lawyer may also be able to determine that some material is
not based on the witness's personal knowledge. Even if the witness's tes-
timony remains unchanged, prior discussion will improve the lawyer's
effectiveness in cross-examination-the archetypal tool of adversarial
truth seeking.72
Despite the benefits a lawyer can obtain by interviewing hostile wit-
nesses, the lawyer who conducts such interviews risks waiving the pro-
tection afforded to some privileged material. A lawyer's private notes of
conversations with a hostile witness are unquestionably core work prod-
uct. In defining the work-product privilege, Hickman made no distinc-
tion between the types of witnesses interviewed, and such a distinction
would not make sense for private notes.73 However, questions asked and
subjects covered may reveal the questioner's concerns and strategy. Be-
cause a lawyer cannot compel a witness to remain silent about matters
discussed in preparation, discussions with a hostile witness are virtually
certain to be communicated to the adversary. The lawyer must, there-
fore, balance the value of obtaining information on important points
against the danger of revealing strategy. In depositions at least, the usual
advice is that the value of the information obtained outweighs the value
plaintiff's counsel posed to him.... it exceeds the permissible bounds of discovery"' (quoting Ford,
82 F.R.D. at 360)); Ceco Steel Prods. Corp. v. H.K. Porter Co., 31 F.R.D. 142, 144 (N.D. Ill. 1962)
(asserting that "the information which defendants here seek should be readily available direct from
the witnesses for the asking and not through disclosure of conversations with counsel held for pur-
poses of discovery and trial preparation").
71. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 208 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976)
(concerning a defense lawyer seeking the opportunity to interview hostile government witnesses pri-
vately). Causing witnesses to reconsider their positions before trial and deposition could have salu-
tary effects on judicial efficiency by encouraging opponents to take a more realistic view of the case
at an earlier point, which could encourage settlement.
72. Edelstein, 526 F.2d at 41-42. The fourth of the late Irving Younger's "Ten Commandments
of Cross-Examination" was "Never ask a question to which you do not already know the answer."
Younger, Cicero on Cross-Examination, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 532, 532-33 (J. Koeltl 2d ed.
1989).
73. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1947) (holding that an attempt to secure
witnesses' written and oral statements made to an attorney during the course of legal representation
"falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prose-
cution and defense of legal claims").
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of absolute secrecy.7 4
Implied waiver of confidential material poses a more difficult prob-
lem for the attorney who interviews a hostile witness. 75 The attorney-
client and work-product privileges can be waived by a disclosure that is
inconsistent with the purposes of the privileges. The attorney-client priv-
ilege is based on the confidential nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship, therefore any disclosure--deliberate or inadvertent-to a third
party constitutes a waiver because it is inconsistent with the purpose of
the privilege.76 The inconsistency test for the attorney-client privilege
would appear to be met by virtually any disclosure to an adverse party,
with the possible emergent exception of inadvertent disclosures. 77 Work
product, on the other hand, does not depend directly on the attorney-
client relationship. Although this qualified privilege provides less abso-
lute protection, it has correspondingly greater flexibility concerning
waiver. Because the secrecy of work product is often important only to
adversaries, only revelation to an adversary is truly inconsistent with the
privilege.78 Nevertheless, while communications with a friendly or neu-
tral (non-client) witness may not result in waiver, disclosure to a hostile
witness is likely to be construed as an implied waiver of a potentially
74. See Facher, Taking Depositions, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 186, 187 (J. Koeltl 2d ed.
1989).
75. The issue here is implied waiver. Deliberate or express waiver is rare and, in any event,
wholly within the power of the party waiving the privilege. Implied waiver, by contrast, is involun-
tary and can be used offensively by an opponent to obtain disclosure of material that the first party
wishes to keep secret. Once established, waiver can be extremely broad. Some courts have held that
very minimal and indirect disclosures can result in wholesale availability of the material. See Nye v.
Sage Prods., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Marshall v. United States Postal
Serv.. 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980) (indicating that answering questions about the accuracy of
documents may result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to the documents in
their entirety). Waiver of the attorney-client and work-product privileges is comprehensively dis-
cussed in two excellent works. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1605-55; Developments in the Law-
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1629-65 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged
Communications].
76. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of [the attorney-client privilege] is inconsistent with the
confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege."); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d
972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) ("A communication divulged to 'strangers' or outsiders can scarcely be
considered a confidential communication between attorney and client."); see also Privileged Commu-
nications, supra note 75, at 1659-65 (discussing the possibility of waiver through a variety of inadver-
tent actions).
77. Inadvertent disclosure has usually been held to constitute waiver. It has, however, been
suggested that this result is unfair and unjustified. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 57, at 1619-48
(arguing that a fairness test should dictate whether a particular privilege has been waived); Privileged
Communications, supra note 75, at 1659-65 (same).
78. See American Tel, 642 F.2d at 1299 ("The purpose of the work product doctrine is to
protect information against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a particular confi-
dential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial preparation."); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that subject-matter waiver is broader
for the attorney-client privilege than for the work-product privilege).
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broad range of confidential witness-preparation materials. 79
The doctrines of privilege and waiver are in constant tension with
each other. The attorney-client and work-product privileges together
provide comprehensive protection for witness preparation. Under this
rubric, many courts have strictly protected oral preparatory activities.
However, there is also considerable judicial hostility toward privileges
and a corresponding willingness to find waiver, because privileges thwart
discovery of information and its sources. 80 As a result, lawyers have
been unable to predict with certainty whether preparatory activities will
be disclosed.
4. Experts: Accuracy and Advocacy.-Experts comprise a fourth
distinct group of witnesses. The function of the expert witness is both the
most neutral and the most partisan. Unlike other witnesses, experts must
be qualified before they testify, and that qualification requires that the
testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue."81 This version of the expert's role is distinctly non-
partisan and is based on the existence of impartial, often scientific,
knowledge.82 It is, therefore, particularly ironic that the use of experts
has led to some of the most notorious abuses of the adversary system.
Often lacking any hint of impartiality, experts have been called "saxo-
phones. '83 Despite any implicit claim that an expert witness speaks im-
partial truth, "the expert's view may have originated with an attorney's
opinion or theory."8S4
The ambiguous role of experts is particularly problematic because
expert witnesses require considerable preparation. They ordinarily lack
the personal knowledge required of other witnesses;85 without prepara-
79. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982)
(explaining that when an attorney freely and voluntarily discloses the contents of an otherwise pro-
tected work product to someone with interests adverse to his client, he may be deemed to have
waived the work-product protection).
80. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (discussing privileges generally and
concluding that "these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth").
81. FED. R. EVID. 702.
82. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
407 (E.D. Va. 1975) (holding that since a party's employees are not "impartial observer[s]," they are
regular witnesses and not expert witnesses, whose conclusions may be work product); see also R.
ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 283 (suggesting that the expert should be presented as a "kindly
teacher").
83. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 835 (1985).
84. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984).
85. See FED. R. EvID. 703 (expert testimony may be based on facts or data "perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing"). The "insider" expert (for example, a product
safety manager) who has both personal knowledge and expert views presents a number of problems
that are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Virginia Elec., 68 F.R.D. at 407 (concluding
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tion, they could not testify at all. Consequently, the Federal Rules of
Evidence contemplate some degree of preparation by the sponsoring
party. The necessity for hypothetical questions has been abolished.8 6
The basis of the expert's testimony can be "facts or data.., made known
... at or before the hearing. ' 87 Witness preparation usually provides the
foundational material for the testimony.
Because the expert's conclusions depend on the groundwork pro-
vided by the preparer, the cross-examiner's access to the preparatory ma-
terial is essential. According to the garbage-in-garbage-out principle, a
witness who receives an inaccurate or biased foundation cannot provide
valid opinions. Rule 705 sensibly provides that experts "may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-exami-
nation."88 Nevertheless, the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are curiously stingy in their provisions for disclosure of the basis for an
expert's testimony. Under the partisan model of the role of experts, com-
munications between an expert and a lawyer are confidential trial prepa-
ration protected by the work-product privilege.8 9 Such discussions
clearly reveal strategy and attempted routes of proof. Rule 26(b)(4),
which modifies the work-product privilege, provides for discovery of
"facts known and opinions held by experts" and "a summary of the
grounds for each opinion," but only through interrogatories. The rule
does not provide a right to use depositions or document requests to ob-
tain this information. Detailed information concerning the basis of an
expert's opinion-presumably what is contemplated by rule 705-may be
obtained only upon motion.90
that a "regular employee, assigned as an expert, meets none of [the] prerequisites" of an expert under
the Federal Rules of Evidence); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co.,
60 F.R.D. 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing "tlhe status of a regular auditor as an expert em-
ployed for specific litigation"); Comment, The In-House Expert Witness: Discovery Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 S. DAK. L. REV. 283, 292 (1988) (noting that "any employee who
has acquired specialized knowledge particular to the factual setting and legal allegations pending
could be classified as an 'in-house' expert witness"). This Article discusses only the "outside"
expert.
86. See FED. R. EVID. 702; id. advisory committee's notes.
87. FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added); see also FED. R. EvtD. 705 ("The expert may testify
in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise."). For a checklist of written materials to be sup-
plied to an expert, see S. BALDWIN, supra note 12, at 427-30.
88. FED. R. EvID. 705.
89. The work of nontestifying experts as advisors to counsel is specifically protected from dis-
covery except in "exceptional circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). The same expert can be
both advisor and witness, but the rule as presently structured would permit full discovery of such a
person.
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 72
F.R.D. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). It may also be obtained, and often is, by agreement of the parties,
For an overview of the problems of discovery of materials provided to a testifying expert, see Note,
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Not surprisingly, the courts have liberally construed rule 26(b)(4),
seldom denying access to "input" material. For example, in "double ex-
pert" cases, in which the evidence of a testifying expert is based on the
work of a nontestifying expert, courts have invariably granted access to
the underlying work, notwithstanding the express protection that the
rules give to the work of nontestifying experts. 91 Moreover, the courts
have been extremely reluctant to accord work-product protection to
communications between a lawyer and an expert. By providing for dis-
covery of expert opinions "developed in anticipation of litigation," rule
26(b)(4) carves out an exception to rule 26(b)(3) for ordinary (nonopi-
nion) work product. Some courts have interpreted rule 26(b)(4) as sim-
ply overriding rule 26(b)(3) for experts who will testify.92
Practical guides for litigators emphasize that lawyers must also care-
fully prepare experts to ensure that their testimony is comprehensible
and to minimize any doubts, uncertainties, or unfavorable views. 93 The
latter purpose of preparation suggests saxophony, but the former is cru-
cial to the expert's usefulness to the trier of fact. Competent preparation
of many cases will require consultation with appropriate experts to sup-
port a client's point of view. The provisions that shield an attorney's
search for an expert witness from discovery reinforce the ethical obliga-
tion to present the strongest possible case for the client.94
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Discovery of Expert Information, 42 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1101, 1151-60 (1988).
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); see also Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D.
393, 398 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (ordering disclosure of a computer database of employment records pre-
pared by defendant); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1137 (S.D.
Tex. 1976) (requiring disclosure of economic database and permitting deposition of experts who
prepared the database).
92. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407-08 (D. Colo. 1983); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v.
Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The Third Circuit, however, has distinguished core work product given to an expert to assist in
developing a theory from materials provided to an expert on which the expert's opinion is based.
The court reasoned that true opinion work product does not include data or facts. The mere exist-
ence of a lawyer's suggestions as to conclusions would not strengthen or weaken the basis of the
expert's conclusions. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 1984); see also
Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert Witness, 85 COLUNI. L. REv. 812,
821-22 (1985) (asserting that rule 26(b)(4) may provide protection for the opinion work of attorneys
and other representatives independently of rule 26(b)(3)); Note, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure of Attorney Opinion Work Product Provided to an Expert Witness, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1159, 1170-73 (1985) (acknowledging that acquisition of the attorney's opinions and theories
from which the expert's opinion was derived would be of little significance and unnecessary).
93. See, e.g., R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 283-89; Hanley, Working the Witness
Puzzle, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 477, 480-81 (J. Koeltl 2d ed. 1989); see also A. TRANKELL,
RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE 159-60 (1972) (psychologist witness must be sure that his testimony is
couched in "clear and understandable language").
94. See Day, Expert Discovery in the Eighth Circuit: An Empirical Study, 122 F.R.D. 35, 41
(1988) (explaining the need to provide immunity for lawyers' searches for and reliance on advisory
experts).
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B. Preparation Methods
Lawyers use several techniques in varying degrees to prepare the
different types of witnesses. A lawyer can prepare a witness to testify by
discussing the matter, by reviewing relevant documents, or by rehearsing
the anticipated direct examination and cross-examination. Each method
may encompass many variations. This section identifies seven basic
preparation techniques and discusses the rules implicated by the use of
these techniques.
1. General Advice: Molding Personality.-The most common kind
of witness preparation is advice on the role of a witness and appropriate
courtroom demeanor. Any lawyer who represents a prospective witness
has a responsibility to explain to the witness, among other things, where
to sit, what to wear, and how to address the judge. The lawyer should
also discuss the required oath and the consequences of its violation. In
addition, the lawyer should identify those who will question the witness
and should instruct the witness to speak clearly, and to verbalize answers
instead of nodding. A lawyer might also explain the importance of being
candid but concise, controlling one's temper, challenging hidden assump-
tions in questions, and looking at the jury. Lists of good advice are le-
gion. 95 A lawyer usually delivers this advice orally in a conference with
the witness, though many lawyers have written instructions that they
give to each prospective witness to save time. 96
General advice is useful in ensuring a relaxed witness who will tes-
tify clearly and who will not be sidetracked or flustered by a cross-exam-
iner. Such general advice is also relatively innocuous in terms of
distorting testimony, because it is nonsubstantive. In some situations,
however, calming and relaxing a witness tends to induce an unwarranted
degree of certainty in the witness's testimony. Such preparation may un-
95. See, e.g., R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 184-211 (explaining how to advise wit-
nesses about the general aspects of testifying); M. DOMBROFF, KEY TRIAL CONTROL TACTICS 311-
17 (1983) (discussing ways to prepare witnesses for direct examination and to anticipate the oppo-
nent's strategy on cross-examination); J. KESTLER, supra note 3, §§ 9.21-.57 (detailing the instruc-
tions to be given to witnesses before testifying); J. SONSTENG, R. HAYDOCK & J. BOYD, THE
TRIALBOOK 213 (1984) [hereinafter J. SONSTENGJ (listing instructions that should be given to wit-
nesses); McElhaney, supra note 13, at 80-82 (explaining how to advise the witness about proper
appearance, actions, and manner of speech).
96. See, e.g., Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 405 (discussing the use of an "expert witness letter"). Se-
crecy is not particularly important for demeanor preparation. While general instructions to wit-
nesses are part of a good litigator's basic stock in trade and as such constitute work product, as a
practical matter demeanor advice is often so generic that it will tell an opponent absolutely nothing
of strategic utility. Secrecy, therefore, would encourage little to be said in this area that would not be
said anyway.
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wittingly turn a skeptical witness into a true believer. 97 For example, in
response to a lawyer's advice to speak clearly and confidently, a witness
might deliberately change an uncertain recognition of a suspect to defi-
nite recognition of the suspect. This change is perjury. But when, as is
more likely, the changed testimony is not deliberately wrong but rather
the result of suggestion, the "true believer" is less obviously, and cer-
tainly less provably, a perjurer.98
Demeanor preparation is extremely problematic when it is designed
to produce a false representation of a witness, because the perjury rules
do not govern this type of witness preparation. At the more acceptable
end of the spectrum are instructions to a witness to adopt a more decisive
manner. In some instances, the "choice of words may ... improve the
clarity and precision of a statement." 99 The opposite end of the spectrum
includes a lawyer's advice intended to make a sociopathic triple-mur-
derer seem like a regular gny.'O Some authors advocate such prepara-
tion as the necessary "remolding" or "transforming" of the witness.101
Professor Follingstad, a psychologist writing for the plaintiffs' bar,
advises how to make witnesses more presentable for trial. 102 The witness
and lawyer together identify the personality traits of the witness and
work to accentuate the positive and suppress the negative. Through nu-
merous discussions, the lawyer urges the witness to "develop" positive
qualities and to adopt "new behaviors. 10 3 Follingstad concludes:
Roleplaying is one of the most important techniques for pro-
ducing desired testimony, but it requires great patience and prac-
97. See supra text accompanying notes 271-306.
98. Bellow and Moulton pose a similar hypothetical. See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra
note 13, at 357 (discussing whether a witness should be advised not to mention her own doubts about
the identity of the accused).
99. Id.
100. The cynical observer might find an example of nonpejurious image creation in the John
DeLorean cocaine trial in 1984. DeLorean, "born again" after his arrest on charges of trafficking in
narcotics, carried a Bible with him to court every day. See Metzler, United Press Int'l, Mar. 31,
1984 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, OMNI file). His wife, Christina Ferrare, played the role of the de-
voted supporter throughout the trial, then left him within a few weeks of his acquittal, having pri-
vately announced her intentions to do so during the trial. See Alexander, Ainother Roadblock for a
Dreamer, TIME, Sept. 30, 1985, at 66, 66; DeLorean and Ferrare Begin Trial Separation, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1984, at A18, col. 5. The couple was later divorced. J. DELOREAN, DELOREAN 329-32
(1985).
101. See J. KESTLER, supra note 3, § 9.02 (noting that "even a shrinking violet can be trans-
formed into a gladiator for your cause"); Vogel, Preparation of Witnessesfor Trial, 19 INS. COUNS. J.
394, 395 (1952) ("Trial counsel has the job of remolding to some extent the personalities of such
witnesses.").
102. See Follingstad, supra note 45, at 54-58.
103. Id. at 52. A "communications consultant" at the Idora Silver & Associates School of Wit-
ness Preparation reports: "In too many cases, the attorney watches in horror as the carefully
coached witness falls apart during testimony, reverting to defective modes of behavior supposedly
corrected by the training program." Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 32.
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tice. While time-consuming, the benefits increase each time
roleplaying is practiced. The result of good roleplaying is the de-
velopment of new skills that appear quite natural. Roleplaying
means just that-playing or practicing behaviors ....
... The lawyer [in a roleplaying session] should observe the
witness carefully, recording any problematic statements and nega-
tive behaviors.'°4
Follingstad specifically denies that the change is meant to be perma-
nent.l05 The witness's trial personality is not, therefore, in any meaning-
ful sense real.
Lawyers at the opposite table have received similar advice. 'The civil
defense bar has learned to personalize the corporate defendant by choos-
ing a likable and moldable witness as the corporate representative, rather
than a person with any useful personal knowledge. 10 6 According to one
commentator, "The witness ... does not know," and the lawyer must
therefore provide, "the specifics of the case, the strategic areas which will
be covered, the manner in which the questions will be asked and what the
responses should be."' 0 7
Since a witness's personality is, of course, not technically an issue at
trial, the effect of a changed personality, standing alone, on the overall
integrity of the judicial system might be minimal. What is troubling,
however, is the thin line between adopting a new personality and adopt-
ing new facts. Both previously quoted writers implicitly recognize that
to modify the personality, a lawyer and witness may have to modify some
of the facts that supported the old personality. 108 Although a lawyer
seems to have a clear duty to present the client as favorably as the facts
permit, 0 9 personality molding obscures the important distinction be-
tween a more attractive personality and more attractive facts.
2. Providing Legal Background: Prompting Perjuty."° -Natu-
rally, one of the matters discussed in 'witness preparation should be the
applicable law. For example, a lawyer in a products liability case should
certainly make some effort to explain the various theories of negligence,
warranty, and strict liability that may be involved. There may be a duty
to explain the law to a client, 1 and in any event, it is hard to imagine a
104. Follingstad, supra note 45, at 56 (emphasis added).
105. See id. at 50 ("Long-standing personality change is not the idea here.").
106. See Parnell, supra note 44, at 53-54.
107. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
108. See Follingstad, supra note 45, at 56; Parnell, supra note 44, at 54.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 32-48.
110. The phrase is Professor Freedman's. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 59.
111. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
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lawyer's refusing to give a client this information. 1 2 Discussion of the
legal background of a lawsuit has obvious utility in preparing any wit-
ness: "Witness preparation has the effect of shaping the testimony, fo-
cusing on the significant, dropping the irrelevant, emphasizing helpful
points, and structuring the presentation to minimize the damage caused
by adverse information. This is the process envisioned by the adversary
system.""13
The process of winnowing the relevant from the irrelevant is not
only a useful partisan activity; it is also an essential element in the or-
derly conduct of a trial before a fact finder with no previous knowledge
of the case.
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to
explain the applicable law in any given situation and to go over
before trial the attorney's questions and the witness' answers so
that the witness will be ready for his appearance in court, will be
more at ease because he knows what to expect, and will give his
testimony in the most effective manner that he can. Such prepara-
tion is the mark of a good trial lawyer, and is to be commended
because it promotes a more efficient administration of justice and
saves time." 4
Relevance, of course, depends on the legal rules applicable to the case. A
lawyer's explaining the rules so that a witness can help the lawyer to
discover relevant facts is far more effective than a lawyer's casting about
alone in the witness's memory for potentially important observations.
There is a less attractive side to discussions of the law with a pro-
spective witness. Such discussions create the strong possibility of shap-
ing testimony to maximize effect or minimize damage. Discussing the
law with a client raises the thorny problem that Professor Freedman la-
beled "Refreshing Recollection or Prompting Perjury. '" 115 Anatomy of a
Murder"t6 provides an extreme example. The lawyer, having been told
by his client facts that would support a first-degree murder conviction,
advises the client what different or additional facts might support a ver-
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity. 1 7 Slightly more subtle is the
technique of describing an exculpatory scenario to the client before the
112. See J. KESTLER, supra note 3, § 9.14; see also G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 13,
at 234 (advising attorneys to explain the basic principles of negligence to witnesses in personal injury
cases); J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 22 (commenting that a witness who is a client needs to know
everything about the case).
113. J. KESTLER, supra note 3, § 9.14, at 332; see also Op. No. 79, supra note 5 (discussing the
ethical limitations on a lawyer's participation in the preparation of a witness).
114. State v. McCormick, 298 N.C. 788, 791, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1979) (citation omitted).
115. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 59.
116. R. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
117. See id. at 44-49.
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client has a chance to tell an incriminating story.'1 8 Acquainting a wit-
ness with the appropriate standard of proof, similarly, might encourage
the witness to assert a degree of certainty that is not otherwise justi-
fied.'19 The opportunity for influence exists with any witness who is dis-
posed to be cooperative.
The line between advising a client and prompting perjury is unclear
both in the 1981 Model Code of Professional Responsibility and in the
1989 Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Disciplinary Rules of
the Model Code are clear that a lawyer may not "[k]nowingly use per-
jured testimony or false evidence," or "[k]nowingly make a false state-
ment of law or fact." 120 The meaning of "knowingly," however, is not
entirely clear. The 1981 Code fails to define the term,' 2' and the 1989
Rules define it as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," which "may
be inferred from circumstances."'' 22 This definition seems to preclude
deliberate avoidance of knowledge. 23 However, the Code does not re-
118. As Professor Hazard points out, this technique should still present a moral dilemma for the
attorney. See G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 130-3 1; cf. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.2(b) (1982) ("It is unprofessional ... to intimate
to the client in any way that the client should not be candid in revealing facts so as to afford the
lawyer free rein to take action .... ").
119. For example, one article advises counsel to tell medical witnesses to "use precise language
to meet the prerequisite of legal causation," citing the failure of the plaintiffs' counsel in a toxic torts
case to instruct medical experts to use the phrase "to a reasonable medical certainty." Broaddus &
Simon, Preparing Experts in Toxic Torts Cases, TRIAL, Oct. 1989, at 35, 36-37. This advice is appro-
priate only in the very unlikely event that the witness is truly certain but would otherwise forget to
express that certainty. Such preparation is cause for concern, however, if the lawyer is encouraging
an uncertain witness to suppress factual doubts to meet legal standards.
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) to (5) (1981); see also
id. EC 7-26 ("prohibit[ing] the use of fraudulent, false, or pejured testimony or evidence" and
adding that "[a] lawyer who knowingly participates in introduction of such testimony or evidence is
subject to discipline"). Model Rule 3.3(a) provides that:
[a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or (4) offer evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know
of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (1989).
121. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1981).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1989). See generally Kimball,
When Does a Lawyer "Know" Her Client Will Commit Perjury?, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 579, 579
(1988) (arguing that the appropriate standard for such knowledge under the Model Rules is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
123. The ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice provide slightly
more guidance in this area of legal uncertainty. A defense lawyer "should probe for all legally
relevant information without seeking to influence the direction of the client's responses," and should
not try "to instruct the client or to intimate to the client in any way that the client should not be
candid in revealing facts so as to afford the lawyer free rein to take action which would be precluded
by the lawyer's knowing of such facts." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-3.2(a) to (b) (1982); see also Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 809, 843 (1977) (arguing that "informing the client about the kind of testimony that would be
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quire the lawyer to seek out reasons to disbelieve a client: "In many
cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of his client, and
in those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his
client."1 24 Similarly, a lawyer is ordinarily entitled to rely on the client
for information on which to base legal opinions or pleadings. 12 5
The ABA clearly does not require lawyers to "protect" their clients
from committing perjury by withholding legal information, but it also
does not endorse Professor Freedman's view that lawyers must always
provide legal information. 126 Freedman has argued that litigants inevita-
bly reconstruct an event with a certain amount of bias; therefore, the
lawyer should be sure that the bias reflects the client's true self-interest
under the applicable legal rules. 127 Ultimately, both the ABA and Freed-
man attempt to draw a distinction between assistance in developing the
facts and creation of facts, 128 but the distinction remains unclear, per-
required in order to produce evidence for a favorable argument in litigation, when it is known that
the client will employ the legal advice to commit perjury" is an example of knowing participation in
perjury).
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6 (1981). Apparently the opposite
of President Reagan's "trust but verify" dictum applies: a lawyer may trust and not verify. See
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974) (stating that "[a]s a general rule an
attorney is not required to investigate the truth or falsity of facts and information furnished by his
client, and his failure to do so would not be negligence on his part unless facts and circumstances of
the particular legal problem could indicate otherwise"); cf Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
691 (1984) (noting that defense counsel may reasonably make strategic choices based solely on infor-
mation supplied by the defendant without further investigation).
125. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, at 3 (1974)
(noting that when an attorney drafts an opinion concerning a securities offering, the duty to verify
does not include a detailed investigation unless the facts provided by the client are materially incom-
plete, suspect, inherently inconsistent, or otherwise open to question); see also Kamen v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1012 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 's duty to make a reasonable inquiry was satisfied by reliance on the client when information was
largely in the control of the opposing party); FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (noting
that the issue of "what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as ... whether
[the lawyer] had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading").
126. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 71 ("There is no conceivable ethical requirement that
the lawyer trap the client into a hasty and ill-considered answer before telling him the significance of
the question."); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1485, 1488 (1966) (arguing that "[a] lawyer should not be paternalistic toward his client, and
cannot assume that his client will perjure himself").
127. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 68-75. An example of explaining the applicable law
to encourage truthful testimony is described in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). Defense
counsel told the defendant that he did not need to perjure himself by claiming to have seen a gun in
the victim's hand, because the claim of self-defense does not require the actual presence of a gun. See
id. at 179-80; cf Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information To Present in Litigation: Its
Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 578-80 (1989) (analyzing effects of legal
advice when a client without advice may make incorrect assumptions concerning what information
is legally favorable).
128. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 71-75. Freedman had taken a more permissive view
of the lawyer's range of ethical action in his original article on the subject. See Freedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 1469, 1478-80 (1966). The ABA observes:
Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence relevant to the state of
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haps inevitably so.129 Given the pressures on lawyers to represent their
clients successfully, doubts are at least as likely to be resolved in favor of
zealousness as strict truthfulness.
3. Factual Context: Competence and Hearsay.-In preparing a
witness, a lawyer usually discusses with the witness the factual context
into which the witness's observations or opinions fit. Lawyers frequently
inform witnesses of facts of which they were previously unaware by tell-
ing the witnesses directly or by comparing the testimony of witnesses
possessing similar knowledge. There are compelling reasons for inform-
ing a witness of other views, and most commentators do not question the
practice.130
Explaining to witnesses the context into which their testimony fits is
integral to the presentation of a coordinated case. Individual witnesses
are likely to testify more intelligently with an understanding of the fac-
tual and legal significance of their observations.1 3 ' This technique in-
creases witnesses' awareness of issues that might otherwise seem
unimportant. In addition, witnesses may, upon reflection, decide that
they are not really sure of the facts or that other witnesses are correct. 132
Without an understanding of the underlying facts, witnesses may be flus-
tered at trial by statements of other persons or by documents of which
they were unaware. 133 Permitting such surprises would be irresponsible
mind of the client at a particular time. He may properly assist his client in the develop-
ment and preservation of evidence of existing motive, intent, or desire; obviously, he may
not do anything furthering the creation or preservation of false evidence.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6 (1981).
129. See D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 247-
88 (1984); M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 60-61; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (1975); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles:
A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1078 (1975).
130. See McElhaney, supra note 13, at 82 (advising attorneys in preparing a witness for direct
examination to discuss the probable testimony of other witnesses); Summit, supra note 13, at 502
("He should see, however, what other witnesses have said about areas of overlapping knowledge....
Areas where he and other witnesses disagree should be discussed at length.").
131. See Summit, supra note 13.
132. For example, suppose an eyewitness to an automobile accident tells the lawyer that the
defendant's car was moving at about 45 miles per hour. The witness does not say (and probably does
not consciously think) that he is unsure -of the speed. Instead, he estimates, based on the unstated
assumption that the speed limit is 45 miles per hour in that rural spot. The lawyer, however, knows
from observing the scene that the speed limit is 30 miles per hour and that the police investigation of
the skid marks showed a speed of 30 miles per hour. There is simply no conceivable reason that it
would be preferable, from a partisan or neutral point of view, for a lawyer to permit a witness to
testify with apparent certainty only to discover later that the witness was not really certain about the
car's speed.
133. See Summit, supra note 13, at 502 ("While somewhat different recollections may not under-
cut an entire case, the witness should not be in the position of disagreeing with others without
knowing it ... whether the witnesses with whom he may disagree are friendly or unfriendly.").
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when they are avoidable. 34 It is also a disservice to the client, to the
witness, and to the court to suggest dishonesty, create confusion, or risk
defeat by presenting testimony containing unimportant or illusory testi-
monial contradictions. Finally, when the witness is a client, loyalty de-
mands full disclosure of the status of the case. It is hard to imagine that
a lawyer would refuse to answer a client who asks what another witness
will say.
One particular form of comparing testimony-providing witnesses
with an opportunity to review their prior statements, including deposi-
tion transcripts-emphasizes the value of this technique. Reviewing
prior statements is an advisable preparatory activity 135 and a witness's
right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 36 Aside from the ob-
vious sense of fairness that witnesses should not unwittingly be hanged
by their own prior statements, 37 the rule makes sense because memory
fades. All witnesses should have the opportunity to consult materials
that bear directly on their trial testimony.
The idea that witnesses should be protected from unknowingly con-
tradicting themselves can be readily generalized to allow protection
against contradicting others. There is no good reason to allow a trial to
get bogged down in apparent contradictions that, if considered carefully,
are illusory or irrelevant. This approach may smack of explaining away
differences, but differences in perspectives between witnesses or between
statements of the same witness are to be expected. Presenting a case con-
taining reconcilable conflicts makes the case seem less credible than it
should and wastes the court's time.
Group preparation, however, is a highly questionable method of in-
forming witnesses of the context into which their testimony fits. Some
practitioners recommend it:
Bring together at the same time your client and all his wit-
nesses, either at your office or at the home of the client. Explain to
them what each is expected to do at trial, go over the testimony
N.ith them collectively, and outline the salient points you hope to
establish.
134. See Bodner, Favretto & Nitschke, Panel Discussion on Preparation of Witnesses, 47 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 169, 179-80 (1978); Parnell, supra note 44, at 55; see also R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra
note 2, at 313 (reporting the results of an attorney survey showing that avoiding surprises is viewed
as one of the most important purposes of the witness preparation process).
135. See Summit, supra note 13, at 502.
136. See FED. R. COv. P. 26(b)(3) (allowing a party to obtain a statement previously made about
the action or its subject matter without the showing otherwise necessary to overcome the work-
product rule).
137. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is another expression of this sense
of fairness. See U.S. CONT. amend. V.
305
Texas Law Review Vol. 68:277, 1989
Use of the group method makes for a united front, a dovetailing of
testimony, and a uniformity of narration. Each witness sees the
case as a whole and the role that he is to play in it. It brings out
errors in perception, faulty observations, and improper judgments.
It sharpens and refreshes recollections, and thus eliminates the
danger of one witness needlessly contradicting another. 138
Obviously, the opportunity for concocting a story in this situation is
enormous, and other practitioners caution against using this tech-
nique.139 Not surprisingly, courts have shown great hostility to this type
of preparation and have frequently required disclosure of the existence
and substance of such meetings. 140
138. E. Low, How TO PREPARE AND TRY A NEGLIGENCE CASE 70-71 (1957); see also R.
ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 263 (encouraging a collective final rehearsal with all witnesses);
J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 22 (noting that lawyers may prepare witnesses individually or in
groups).
The following excerpt from the transcript of a coaching session involving a lawyer and three
principal government witnesses provides some insight into the mechanics of this approach. The
lawyer, who did not represent the government or any other party in the litigation, worked with the
witnesses because she wanted the prosecution to be successful. The transcript is fully discussed in
United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1442-45 (6th Cir. 1986). Speaking to the witnesses, the
lawyer said:
"The purpose of this meeting tonight is so we can help each other remember exactly what
happened, how it happened, when it happened and all the minor details. ... I was talking
with [a fourth witness, not present at the meeting] ... but according to his version of the
facts, it's quite different from what I have so far understood them to be. So, I would center
on my facts on what you, three of you, say they are and somehow try to either fit all the
other facts around these, or if they don't fit, then I have to watch out, you know, there's
something else, somebody saying something else."
Id. at 1431 n.2 (quoting Lisa Chan). Ebens is considered further in subpart IV(C).
139. See, e.g., R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 89 (advising on pragmatic grounds that
only two people, the lawyer and the witness, should participate in initial witness interview); Vogel,
supra note 101, at 398 (arguing that interviewing witnesses in a group is "usually unwise").
140. See United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that com-
munications were not privileged when the lawyer tried separately to encourage several witnesses to
present "a uniform, knowingly untruthful story"); Ebens, 800 F.2d at 1431 & n.2 (holding that the
trial court's exclusion of a tape that recorded a third party's coaching of three prosecution witnesses
to resolve conflicts in their testimony was reversible error); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F.2d 972, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that conversations between codefendants and their attor-
ney were admissible, even if protected by the attorney-client privilege, because "[t]he conversations
in question dealt with plans to commit perjury").
Once trial begins, the court can order sequestration of the witnesses to avoid group preparation.
See FED. R. EVID. 615 (providing for the exclusion of certain witnesses). "The efficacy of excluding
or sequestering witnesses has long been recognized as a means of discouraging and exposing
fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion." FED. R. EvID. 615 advisory committee's note.
An interesting example of the extent to which witness preparation is governed by informal
understandings instead of clear rules involved a case in which the court had ordered the witnesses to
leave the courtroom and to refrain from discussing their testimony until the jury returned its verdict.
Nevertheless, during a weekend recess, defense counsel met with three defense witnesses and dis-
cussed the testimony of a key prosecution witness. The Ohio Committee on Legal Ethics and Profes-
sional Conduct declined to render an opinion on the ethical propriety of the defense lawyer's
conduct concluding, iter alia, that it was a question of law whether the court's order had been
violated. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 81-2 (1981) (excerpted in ABA/BNA, LAWYERS'
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:6825 (1984)). It is remarkable that it would even occur
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Informing witnesses of the factual context of their testimony can
also run afoul of the fundamental principle of evidence that the witness
and not the lawyer testifies. Witnesses can testify competently only to
matters within their personal knowledge.141 Under this rubric, courts
have excluded testimony by persons so subject to suggestion that their
testimony was not fairly their own. Witnesses prepared by hypnosis 142
and children 43 are familiar examples. Witness preparation can also sug-
gest information that a witness then adopts as "personal knowledge."
Providing information in this manner-educating the witness-can alter
testimony by demonstrating contradictions or unduly increase witness
certainty by supplying corroboration. Similarly, courts prohibit hear-
say' 44 because the witness lacks personal knowledge of the truth of mat-
ters asserted by an out-of-court declarant. 145 Information obtained solely
from counsel during preparation-information not within the witness's
personal knowledge-is also hearsay.
The competence and hearsay rules serve as minimum protections
against attempts to educate witnesses. However, both rules require ob-
jections raised at trial, and the ability to raise them successfully requires
to the attorney to advise the witnesses in view of the sequestration order. Assuming the lawyer's
good faith, one can only conclude that this form of preparation was so routine to the defense lawyer
that he did not believe that a sequestration order prohibited it.
The Supreme Court has recognized that, notwithstanding the likelihood of preparation activi-
ties occurring, a sequestration order of this duration could not preclude conversations between a
criminal defendant and counsel. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1976) (holding
that preventing the defendant from consulting counsel during a seventeen-hour overnight recess
during trial deprived defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amend-
ment). But see Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600 (1989) (declining to apply Geders to a brief recess
between direct examination and cross-examination).
141. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
142. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 183-84, 644 P.2d 1266, 1269-71
(1982) (en bane) (holding that post-hypnotic testimony is inadmissible because hypnosis is too sug-
gestive and cross-examination is difficult). A dissenter suggested, however, that if testimony is to be
excluded on these grounds, then courts would not allow lawyers to talk to witnesses before trial. See
id. at 191, 644 P.2d at 1277. See generally Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-
Is It Competent?, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155, 155-204 (1983) (arguing that previously hypno-
tized witnesses are incompetent to testify concerning matters discussed under hypnosis).
143. See generally Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the nflu-
ence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 707-21 (1987) (noting that "a young child is, in
certain respects, more vulnerable to suggestion than an adult and more liable to confuse memory of
fact with memory of fantasy" and arguing that judges should review the effects of child-witness
interviewing and preparation procedures in evaluating the reliability of the evidence). However,
some have argued that the suggestibility of children is overstated relative to the suggestibility of
adults. See Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony, and Recan-
tation, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 145, 164-65 (1986) (maintaining that "[r]ecent studies show that chil-
dren's memories are quite good, and that children may not be any more 'suggestible' than adults, at
least under certain circumstances" (footnote omitted)).
144. See FED. R. EVID. 802; see also FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted").
145. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 726-29 (3d ed. 1984).
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that the objector know that the witness has been educated. Witness edu-
cation may not be obvious to an opposing attorney, and subtly prepared
witnesses may not realize that their observations have been expanded
during discussions with counsel.
4. Factual Details: Cross-Examination.-The most basic function
of witness preparation is to elicit in detail what the witness knows. Elic-
iting detailed information is necessary if lawyers are to satisfy their ethi-
cal obligations to be fully familiar with the case and to present the case
persuasively. 146 Unlike providing factual context, eliciting factual details
results in testimony that is likely to be the witness's own. The policy
problem is not whether the preparation has added to the witness's knowl-
edge, but whether suggestive questions have distorted existing percep-
tions. The legal issue is not whether the lawyer should interrogate the
witness during preparation, but the manner in which the interrogation
should be conducted.
The most troubling questioning technique is leading the witness to
particular recollections-"The light was green, wasn't it?"-or to partic-
ular interpretations-"The letter was a firm offer, wasn't it?" One
writer, for example, suggests that it is improper to tell a witness what to
say, but nevertheless recommends astonishingly leading questions-
"'Was Jones going north; or wasn't it true that he was traveling
south?'"147 Other commentators describe "subtle and indirect" tech-
niques "that investigators employ to influence witnesses." 148 A study of
adversarial behavior in law students identified about twenty-five different
coercive, deceptive, or manipulative interrogation techniques.1 49 These
techniques are often, unfortunately, effective. Psychologists have demon-
strated that leading questions not only give the witness conscious clues to
shaping the testimony, but can also influence the testimony in such a way
that the witness has no sense of lacking candor.1 50
There is no simple method for combatting suggestive questioning
during witness preparation. Courts must rely principally on cross-exami-
nation and impeachment as the instruments of truth in the adversary
system. In theory, no matter how biased the witness, incomplete the tes-
timony, or false the story, cross-examination and impeachment will re-
146. See supra section II(B)(1).
147. Vogel, supra note 101, at 397.
148. R. HAYDOCK, D. HERR & J. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 49
(1985). But see Rieger, Dombroffon Unfair Tactics (Book Review), 69 MINN. L. REV. 1430, 1439
(1985) (criticizing legal "gamesmanship" as sometimes leading to bad advice and ethical problems).
149. See Stark, supra note 4, at 411-13.
150. See infra subpart III(A).
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veal motives, fill in gaps, and expose falsehoods. 15 1 The Supreme Court
has recently reaffirmed its faith in cross-examination: "Skillful cross-ex-
amination could develop a record which the prosecutor in closing argu-
ment might well exploit by raising questions as to the defendant's
credibility, if it developed that defense counsel had in fact coached the
witness as to how to respond on the remaining direct examination and on
cross-examination." 152
Whether cross-examination deserves the praise heaped upon it or
the faith placed in it is an open question. For every tale of a brilliant,
slashing "but for which the case would have surely been lost" cross-ex-
amination, there are hundreds of cross-examinations that are barely ser-
viceable. Judge Frank has said that a "cool, steady liar who happens not
to be open to contradiction will baffle the most skillful cross-examiner in
the absence of accidents, which are not so common in practice as persons
who take their notions on the subject from anecdotes or fiction would
suppose."t 53
Even assuming that a massive program of continuing legal educa-
tion could improve the lack-luster cross-examination skills of most law-
yers, objectively false but subjectively true testimony would still be a
problem. This problem involves a witness whose accurate memory of an
event has been altered unintentionally during the course of witness prep-
aration by the witness or, possibly, by the lawyer. In the absence of de-
monstrably more reliable evidence to the contrary, opposing lawyers will
remain unable to discredit such testimony because the witness sincerely
believes the testimony is true. 154 In the absence of directly contradictory
evidence, cross-examination is effective, it is said, because the witness's
151. See, eg., Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 601 n.7 (1989) (quoting United States v. DiLapi,
651 F.2d 140, 149-51 (2d Cir. 1981) and emphasizing the importance of cross-examination as a "tool
for ferreting out truth"); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1975) (noting the effective-
ness of compulsory process as an aid to a complete development of all facts); L. STRYKER, THE ART
OF ADVOCACY 85 (1954) (asserting that "there is no better laboratory for the dissection of human
character and motives" than a trial); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1974) (concluding that cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth"); Gardner, The Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 402-03 (1933) (noting that
"[c]ross-examination offers an often-ignored opportunity to discover the effect of suggestion").
152. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90 (1976); see also United States v. Ebens, 800
F.2d 1422, 1430-31 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a defendant is entitled to use a transcript of coach-
ing discussions in cross-examination).
153. Frank, "Short of Sickness anid Death'" A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism,
26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 559 (1951); see Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084-85
(9th Cir. 1977) (Duniway, J., concurring and dissenting). The classic example of the "cross-exam-
iner-as-superman" genre is Irving Younger's lecture on cross-examination. See Younger, supra note
72, at 534.
154. See Damaska, Presentation ofEvidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083,
1094 (1975); see also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 86 (1950) (remarking that by "[t]elling and
retelling it to the lawyer, [the witness] will honestly believe that his story ... is true").
309
Texas Law Review
demeanor will expose any falsehoods during hostile interrogation. Un-
fortunately, however, evaluating the truthful or untruthful demeanor of a
witness may be extremely difficult. Judge Duniway has observed:
I am convinced, both from experience as a trial lawyer and from
experience as an appellate judge, that much that is thought and
said about the trier of fact as a lie detector is myth or folklore....
[I]t is not unusual for an accomplished liar to fool a jury (or even,
heaven forbid, a trial judge) into believing him because his de-
meanor is so convincing.
Conversely, many trial lawyers, and some trial judges, will ad-
mit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but unsophisticated or
timid witness may be-or can be made by an astute cross-examiner
to be-such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge to be a
liar. 155
Judge Weinstein adds that demeanor is even less probative when a lawyer
has prepared the witness for testimony. 156 Recognizing this fact, practi-
cal guides to witness preparation usually contain a whole host of sugges-
tions for improving demeanor to avoid the appearance of
untruthfulness. 157
Cross-examination also has some discouraging side effects. Im-
peaching a witness in cross-examination typically involves drawing atten-
tion to inconsistencies in progressive tellings of the same story or to
details that were omitted from earlier statements but were later recalled.
As explained previously, careful preparation can avoid insignificant or
illusory inconsistencies. By expecting entirely unrealistic completeness
and consistency in a witness's perception, memory, and recitation, the
legal system values the well-rehearsed witness, though not one with "the
rehearsed look,"158 more highly than the less polished but more sponta-
neous witness. Obviously, inconsistency can denote uncertainty or
155. Penasquitos Village, 565 F.2d at 1084-85 (Duniway, J., concurring and dissenting). De-
spairing of cross-examination as an accurate means for eliciting the truth, Judge Frank relied on the
indefinable sense of a witness's credibility that a judge and jury receive from the witness's behavior
and demeanor. See J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 20-21; see also L. STRYKER, supra note 151, at 87,
99 (describing the effects of the demeanor and appearance of witnesses); Frank, supra note 153, at
559-61 (noting that commentators agree that it is impossible to formulate systematic rules to aid trial
judges in assessing a witness's credibility).
156. See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 334 n.20 (1961); see also
supra section II(B)(1) (discussing "the thin line between adopting a new personality and adopting
new facts").
157. See, e.g., M. Jox, LAWYER'S CONCISE GUIDE TO TRIAL PROCEDURE 10-12 (1965) (dis-
cussing the attorney's final interview with clients and witnesses, in which he informs them of the
procedures followed when testifying in court); R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 25-36
(6th printing 1954) (analyzing the various approaches one could take when preparing witnesses,
including dress and nervousness); McElhaney, supra note 13, at 80-82 (discussing witness prepara-
tion in areas of dress, demeanor, and speech).
158. J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 214 (emphasis added).
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fabrication. Perfect consistency, however, is also a sign of perjury. 159
Consequently, a good cross-examiner can depict a witness's consistency
or inconsistency as evidence of unreliability. Therefore, to the extent that
cross-examination is effective in raising doubts about a witness's credibil-
ity, it is equally effective in discrediting both honest and dishonest
witnesses. ' 60
The debate over the effectiveness of cross-examination as a remedy
for improper witness preparation is exemplified in the Supreme Court's
recent treatment of a criminal defendant's right to consult with counsel
during trial. The majority permitted limitations on such conferences
during the defendant's testimony, endorsing the view that truth seeking
is best served by not giving a witness the "opportunity to regroup and
regain a.poise and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not
possess."' 61 The dissent took issue--quite rightly, in view of the forego-
ing discussion-with the notion that "the punch-drunk witness ... con-
tributes to the search for the truth."1 62 Like Judge Duniway, Professor
Langbein concludes that the efficacy of cross-examination is "nothing
more than an article of faith." 163 This assessment is accurate. While the
adversary system touts the effectiveness of cross-examination for re-
vealing the truth, there is little empirical support for this conclusion. As
a result, witness preparation that consists of reviewing factual details
presents a particularly troublesome dilemma. More than discussing fac-
tual or legal context, this type of preparation is a core pretrial activity,
yet it can have subtle and highly deleterious effects on the accuracy of
testimony.
5. Privileged Documents: Fairness and Waiver.-For several rea-
sons a lawyer may want to use work-product documents to prepare a
witness. Setting out in a letter or memorandum the important points of a
case, its problem areas, and the approach to proof can be a fast, conve-
159. See Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Comment: Effects of Kind of Question and Atmosphere
of Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1620, 1637 (1971);
Vogel, supra note 101, at 398. A good example of perfected testimony occurred in the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company case, in which the defense lawyer, by having a prosecution witness repeat her
story three times almost verbatim, raised the inference that the opposing lawyer had coached the
witness. See F. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 69-72 (4th ed. 1936); Landsman,
Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testi-
mnony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. Prr. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1984).
160. See Frankel, supra note 129, at 1039. A cross-examiner who knows that a witness is telling
the truth, however, is not ethically permitted to impeach the witness. See ABA STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-5.7(b) (1982) (prosecution
function); id. Standard 4-7.6(b) (defense function); Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 675-76.
161. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 601 (1989).
162. Id. at 606 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
163. Langbein, supra note 83, at 833 n.31.
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nient, and inexpensive way to prepare a witness. 164 Similarly, it is often
efficient and effective to use a deposition digest or edited transcript to
inform a witness of the testimony of others.1 65 One practitioner recom-
mends providing a witness with a written summary, based on discussions
with the witness, of the expected testimony. 166 Other work-product ma-
terial might include compilations of data or chronologies of important
events. The attorney-client privilege can be implicated if the lawyer re-
views with the client-witness written communications that relate to the
subject matter of the testimony.167
The law is reasonably clear that mere review of privileged material
by someone who later becomes a witness does not waive either privi-
lege. 168 Direct use of the privileged material, however, or placing that
material into issue, does constitute a waiver. 169 In United States v.
Nobles,170 the defendant sought to call to the stand a defense investigator
to impeach the testimony of two eyewitnesses. The investigator would
have testified, based on the notes of his conversation with the prosecution
witnesses, that both were very uncertain of their observations when they
originally spoke with the investigator. 171 The Supreme Court, reasoning
that the proposed "testimonial use" of the investigator's interview notes
would have waived any privilege attaching to them, upheld the district
court's refusal to permit the investigator to testify without disclosing the
164. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1613-14.
165. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 405-06 (D. Colo. 1983).
166. See Summit, supra note 13, at 503. Since the summary is based on thorough interrogation
of the witness, the summarized testimony is not a created story but an aid to witness preparation.
This technique, however, may create in the witness unjustified certainty based on the written re-
sponses. See infra text accompanying notes 134-152.
167. See, e.g., S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 408-09 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(holding that party's use of notes to refresh memory during deposition constitutes waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege for the portion of the notes consulted); Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101
F.R.D. 674, 677-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding that merely inspecting documents in preparation
for deposition would not waive attorney-client privilege); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller &
Phipps (Haw.), Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 119-20 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (concluding that witness's looking at
documents to prepare for deposition does not waive attorney-client privilege if testimony does not
appear to rely on the documents).
As a general rule, attorney-client correspondence, especially from the client, presents little dan-
ger of distorting testimony when it reflects the client's own roughly contemporaneous impressions.
Cf. id. at 120 n.2 (remarking that there is a greater danger of inaccurate testimony if the witness does
not review correspondence before testifying).
168. See E. CLEARY, supra note 52, § 93, at 224 n.5 (noting that it is generally agreed that a
party-client's taking the stand as a witness does not constitute a waiver of the lawyer-client privilege
for secrecy of communications).
169. See id. § 93, at 224 (noting that if the party-client introduces a part of the correspondence,
production of the rest may be demanded).
170. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
171. See id. at 227-29. This attempted use of the investigator's testimony would have provided
an excellent remedy for reducing the effectiveness of the prosecution's witnesses. The defense at-
tempted to establish that the witnesses' subsequent conversations with the prosecutor increased cer-
tainty and perhaps distorted recollection.
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notes. 17 2
Witness preparation seems to fall between mere review and testimo-
nial use. It is more influential than review, but it is not testimonial be-
cause the witness does not testify about the work product. Thus, the
courts usually require disclosure of work-product materials given to ex-
perts, using a range of legal theories. 173 However, several courts have
refused to require witnesses-both clients and third-party witnesses-to
reveal what documents they reviewed or what discussions took place be-
tween them and counsel in preparation for testimony. 174
The use of privileged documents to prepare a witness raises several
fairness problems. A lawyer can educate the witness with documents
that the opponent is unaware of or unable to use for cross-examina-
tion.175 An attorney can influence testimony by creating recollection or
instilling unjustified certainty. 176 Lawyers can also use partial disclo-
sure-make "strategic" use-of privileged documents to limit or distort
the opponent's understanding of the case.177 In each instance, the oppo-
nent has no access to the materials that constitute some of the basis for
the witness's testimony. The difficulties are not unique to privileged doc-
uments; in a sense, the whole witness-preparation process involves influ-
ences on testimony. Documents, however, can be uniquely influential on
a witness's testimony. 178
Professor Marcus has proposed a fairness test for disclosure of privi-
leged documents used in witness preparation. 179 He recommends that
courts appropriate the test used for discovery of material covered by Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which prohibits disclosure of "mat-
ters occurring before the grand jury."' 180 Grand jury secrecy is jealously
guarded. To obtain disclosure, the person seeking grand jury materials
172. Id. at 239. This case involved the work product of the investigator, who was the defend-
ant's agent. The notes, thoughts, or mental impressions of a lawyer were not at issue. See id. at 238-
39.
173. See, e.g., Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407-08 (D. Colo. 1983) (holding work product
discoverable under rule 26(b)(4) but not under rule 612); United States v. Internation Business
Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 82 (D.C.N.Y. 1976) (requiring a plaintiff to produce documents that
were considered by its expert witnesses "in arriving at opinions and conclusions to which they will
testify during trial except to the extent that such documents contain information generated by the
expert").
174. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
175. This problem is Professor Marcus's principal concern. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1647.
176. See id. at 1644.
177. See Privileged Communications, supra note 75, at 1632-35; see also Marshall v. United
States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1980) (discussing the full disclosure rule, which
prevents litigants from disclosing only self-serving portions of privileged communications).
178. See text accompanying notes 183-185.
179. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1647-48.
180. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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must make a strong showing of "particularized need."' 18 Under Mar-
cus's proposal, the appropriate inquiry would ask whether the use of the
privileged document limited unfairly the ability of the opposing lawyer to
cross-examine or whether the use was an abusive method for immunizing
preparation from scrutiny. 182 Application of this standard to witness
preparation involving otherwise privileged documents seems an emi-
nently sensible suggestion. Moreover, it takes law that pulls in two direc-
tions-privilege and waiver-explicitly recognizes the conflict and
directly balances the competing concerns under the single, fundamental
criterion of fairness.
6. Discoverable Documents: Recollection Refreshed.-Practition-
ers universally recommend that before taking the stand, witnesses review
any non-privileged documents that are important to the case.1 83 Docu-
ments are usually very important in cases of any complexity. Careful
review of important documents is crucial for the development of the facts
by all parties and by the tribunal. Procedurally, because each document
can be lengthy, review while a witness testifies is impractical. Moreover,
documents often contain subtleties that a brief reading or review will
miss. An unprepared witness is left open to inaccurate suggestion from a
cross-examiner.
Pretrial document review is also substantively important. Docu-
ments are often meaningful only in the context of other documents and
other testimony. The history of a letter or subsequent correspondence
can explain an ambiguous reference, alter its meaning, or indicate that a
proposal was later discarded. In context, an apparently important and
damaging letter may turn out to be insignificant or even helpful. Written
material can also simply be wrong. It is as subject to error as oral testi-
mony, but because fact finders give great credence to written materials,
the testifying witness must be in a position to explain any such errors or
be prepared to support a different story.' 84 The Third Circuit has noted
that unless a witness has reviewed documents prior to a deposition,
"neither plaintiff nor defendant [will] realize the full benefit of a well-
prepared deponent's testimony."' 85
181. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-24 (1979); United States
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
182. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1654-55.
183. See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 13, at 233; J. KEsTLER, supra note 3,
§ 9.19, at 336.
184. See . JEANS, supra note 49, § 5.15, at 298.
185. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985). The court's
logic in this sentence is circular, but the point-that preparation has significant benefits-is well
taken.
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Many lawyers, after initial consultation with all potential witnesses
and other preparatory activities, collect and organize the important doc-
uments for further review with each witness. Although the lawyer can
use mechanical selection criteria, such as all documents that contain the
witness's name, it is usually more effective for the lawyer to choose docu-
ments based on an analysis of the entire case. 18 6 The selection of docu-
ments for review by a witness, therefore, involves some of the most
important and detailed judgments that lawyers make in preparing for
trial.187 "In cases that involve reams of documents and extensive docu-
mentary discovery, the selection and compilation of documents is often
more important than legal research."1 88 By gathering together, selecting,
and organizing documents for witnesses to review, the lawyer makes
choices between the relevant and irrelevant, the important and unimpor-
tant, the sensitive and innocuous. 189 The documents selected for review
also reflect the lawyer's efforts to gather other information about the
case, including facts obtained from the client. 190 Ultimately, they reveal
the lawyer's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case and
the strategy for handling both.
The collection of these documents implicates the core work-product
privilege for lawyers' mental impressions and thought processes,' 9 ' even
though each individual document is discoverable. Disclosure of such col-
lections would result in all the evils that Hickman sought to avoid: it
would discourage thorough preparation because lawyers would fear dis-
closure of strategies, and it would encourage the use of "sharp practices"
intended to mislead an opponent. 192 Protection of this work product pre-
vents one party from capitalizing on another's intelligence and avoids the
possibility of the lawyer's becoming a witness if preparation becomes a
substantive issue in the case. Courts have uniformly recognized that the
186. See J. KESTLER, supra note 3, § 9.19, at 336; Parnell, supra note 44, at 55.
187. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1986).
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. For example, Colonel North's binders probably contained not only notes that he prepared
himself but also a selection of the many documents supplied to him by the committees, and perhaps
some other materials. North's lawyers presumably prepared these notebooks based on conversations
with their client, their own evaluation of the available documents, and other preparatory activities.
191. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1937); see also Note, Work Product Protec-
don for Compilations of Nonparty Documents: A Proposed Analysis, 66 VA. L. REv. 1323, 1340
(1980) (arguing that an attorney's compilations of documents in preparation for litigation should
receive work-product protection "if they emerge from a selection and arrangement process requiring
significant effort on the part of an attorney and resulting in a product of a value greater than that of
the documents themselves").
192. One example is a lawyer's collection of documents that contains irrelevant and unhelpful
materials calculated to confuse and mislead opposing counsel. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
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selection process constitutes core work product. 193 Courts, therefore,
cannot compel lawyers to reveal the methods they employed to select
materials for witness preparation.
Courts should also protect from discovery the collection of docu-
ments itself. Disclosure of the compilation implicitly reveals the thought
processes of the attorney who gathered the documents. Until recently,
most practitioners believed that the collection was protected from disclo-
sure,194 probably because general waiver rules do not compel disclosure
of these preparatory collections under the "mere review" rationale. 195
However, several courts have found waiver through the operation of
Federal Rule of Evidence 612, which requires disclosure of material used
either before or during testimony to refresh a witness's recollection. 196 A
witness's review of a document or collection of documents during prepa-
ration raises the familiar problem of distinguishing between education of
the witness and distortion of the witness's memory. Rule 612 provides
the cross-examiner with the opportunity to test the accuracy of the wit-
ness's refreshed memory and to assess the writin'g's capacity to refresh
the witness's memory.197
The seminal case finding waiver on this theory is Berkey Photo v.
193. See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 315-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985); N.F.A.
Corp. v. Riverview Narrow Fabrics, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 85-86 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Jaroslawicz v.
Engelhard Corp., 115 F.R.D. 515, 517 (D.N.J. 1987); Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D.
671, 683-84 (D. Kan. 1986); Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. 109 F.R.D.
615, 616 (D. Neb. 1986); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982);
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Sporck,
759 F.2d at 319-20 (Seitz, J., dissenting) (arguing that the possibility of extrapolation from the docu-
ments used to prepare a witness to an attorney's litigation strategy is too remote to deserve
protection).
194. See, e.g., Herndon & Karl, supra note 12, at 140 (concluding a demonstration preparation
session with: "Leave your witness preparation books with me"); see also Cambridge Indus. Prods. v.
Metal Works, Ltd., Dornach, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 835, 837 (D. Mass. 1979) (noting
that the average practicing attorney could not have anticipated the invocation of rule 612 to material
otherwise protected by the work-product privilege).
195. See text accompanying note 168.
i96. Federal Rule of Evidence 612 reads in pertinent part:
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the
interests ofjustice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing,
to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those por-
tions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
FED. R. EviD. 612.
197. See E. CLEARY, supra note 52, § 9, at 20 (noting that disclosure permits an opponent to test
the claim that a witness's memory has been revived and to search for inconsistencies between the
document and the testimony); Foster, The Jencks Act-Rule 26.2-Rule 612 Interface-"Conusion
Worse Confounded," 34 OKLA. L. REV. 679, 718-19 (1981) (explaining that disclosure and the op-
portunity to cross-examine provide procedural safeguards). A jury might be equally suspicious of
something that is too direct-a note from the lawyer to the witness in an auto-accident case saying,
"Remember that the light was green"-or too indirect-a letter from the witness's mother that
reminds him of the prime interest rate on April 1, 1978.
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Eastman Kodak.1 98 In Berkey, Kodak's counsel prepared notebooks
containing important background documents and gave these notebooks
to Kodak's expert economics witnesses. Berkey's counsel requested cop-
ies of the notebooks. Before the enactment of the federal rules, experi-
ence with access to preparatory materials was mixed, reflecting the
uncertain status of before-testimony refreshment of memory under the
common law. Two courts had ordered production, 199 one had refused,200
and one had hedged.20 These cases provide little guidance because each
involved fact situations significantly different from the others and from
Berkey. The Berkey court issued a prospective holding, concluding that
protection of such materials would be waived if they were used to pre-
pare witnesses for trial.202 Judge Frankel indicated that any collection of
writings having an impact on the testimony of a witness triggers rule 612
and that rule 612 requires disclosure, even though the collection consti-
tutes core work product.20 3 Judge Frankel was disturbed by the poten-
tial for a lawyer to "prepare-and thus, very possibly, . . . influence and
shape-testimony," without providing the opponent an opportunity to
examine the preparatory materials.20 4
Immediately after Berkey, a series of opinions followed Judge Fran-
kel's reasoning. In James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,205 officers and
employees of James Julian reviewed a lawyer-prepared binder containing
selected documents that the company had produced or was willing to
produce.20 6 The district court held that rule 612(2) effected a waiver and
198. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
199. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1140 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (ordering production of trial expert's technical documentation pertaining to computer sys-
tems); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. II1. 1972) (finding waiver of work-
product and attorney-client privileges based on use of documents during deposition to refresh wit-
ness's recollection).
200. See La Chemise LaCoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 168-69 (D. Del. 1973) (holding
that opposing counsel does not have an absolute right to inspect privileged documents used to pre-
pare a witness before a deposition and limiting Bailey to documents used to refresh a witness's
recollection during testimony at the deposition).
201. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding a lack of evi-
dence that witness actually used documents for refreshment and declining to reach the issue of
whether documents used to refresh witness's memory before testifying must be disclosed to opposing
counsel).
202. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617.
203. Id. at 615-16.
204. Id. at 616; see also Wheeling-Pittsbur gh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81
F.R.D. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that use of privileged documents to refresh a witness's recol-
lection prior to testimony serves as an effective waiver of the privilege); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Il1. 1972) (concluding that use of work-product documents to refresh a
witness's recollection constitutes a waiver of the work-product doctrine).
205. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
206. Id. at 144.
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ordered the lawyers to produce the binder in its entirety. 20 7 James Julian
and cases like it typically rely on an expansive view of the need to cross-
examine; they also emphasize accurate fact finding as a trial's overriding
goal. Some of the cases also focus on the possibility that lawyers prepar-
ing witnesses may exploit the secrecy of witness preparation by influenc-
ing the testimony.208
As attractive as the Berkey waiver theory may appear, rule 612 is
actually a poor candidate for a general waiver rule. The language of the
rule is silent on its relation to privilege, and the rule's history lends no
support to an expansive reading. The common-law rule was unclear on
the status of refreshing the memory before trial. Usually, there was no
absolute entitlement to such materials, although they might be obtained
in the trial court's discretion. 20 9 A considerable body of opinion had crit-
icized the common-law distinction between at trial and before trial be-
cause it was arbitrary and capable of producing bizarre results.210
Accepting these criticisms, the Advisory Committee included access to
writings used "before testifying" in rule 612, but added the caveat that
disclosure should occur only "if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice. 211 The Advisory Committee specifi-
207. Id. at 144-45; see Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393, 398 (N.D. Ill.
1980); R.J. Herely & Son v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D. 358, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Cambridge Indus.
Prods. v. Metal Works, Ltd., Dornach, 4 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 835, 837-38 (D. Mass. 1979); Wheeling-
Pittsburgh, 81 F.R.D. at 11; Prucha v. M & N Modem Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207, 209-10
(W.D. Wis. 1977).
208. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) (holding use of attorney's opinion
in formulating expert opinion waives privilege over attorney's opinion); James Julian, Inc., v. Ray-
theon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 146 (D. Del. 1982) (finding that when counsel makes the "decision to
educate witnesses," the other side should have the benefit of disclosure). One of Judge Frankel's
reasons for granting a prospective holding in Berkey was the lack of an intention to exploit secrecy.
See Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617.
209. See Needelman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 362
U.S. 600 (1960); see also FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee's note (explaining that the judge
may have discretion in the matter, even though there is no entitlement to access); Foster, supra note
197, at 719 & n.166 (criticizing the suggestion that the rule of entitlement should be extended to all
materials used to refresh a witness's memory either before or during trial).
210. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 29 Ill. 2d 97, 108-12, 193 N.E.2d 814, 820-22 (1963) (holding that
there is no substantial or logical difference between the witness's use of documents to refresh recol-
lection prior to testimony and the same use during testimony, because "the opportunity for mischief
or error is equally present regardless of where or when the inspection of the documents occurs");
State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 521-29, 138 A.2d 1, 5-10 (1958) (citing State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136
A.2d 761 (1957), as "unequivocally reject[ing] any distinction" between refreshing recollection
before trial and refreshing it at trial and quoting Mucci for the proposition that " 'the one case is as
compelling in reason and logic as the other,"' id. at 436, 136 A.2d at 767); State N. Mucci. 25 N.J.
423, 430-38, 136 A.2d 761, 766-70 (1957) (concluding that the rule that applies to writings used by
the witness before trial should be the same as the rule that applies to writings used by the witness on
the stand and holding that the refusal of the trial court to allow inspection by opposing counsel of
the documents was reversible error); State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 104-06, 100 A. 64, 69-70 (1917)
(holding that the trial court erred in refusing to permit opposing counsel to examine a record used to
refresh the witness's memory the morning of testimony).
211. FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee's note; see also Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 81 F.R.D. at
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cally noted that the rule was worded "to safeguard against using the rule
as a pretext for wholesale exploration of an opposing party's files." '212
The House was more cautious than the Advisory Committee. Con-
cerned over the Advisory Committee's suggestion that the rule "could
result in fishing expeditions among a multitude of papers which a witness
may have used in preparing for trial, ' 213 the House went even further to
protect privileges. The House Committee's report said: "The Commit-
tee intends that nothing in the Rule be construed as barring the assertion
of a privilege with respect to writings used by a witness to refresh his
memory. "214 As the House Committee intended, rule 612 is structurally
subject to rule 501, which recognizes the common-law privileges.215
Invocation of rule 612 requires the establishment of several founda-
tional facts involving the witness whose memory is being refreshed; these
required foundational findings are highly unsuited to Berkey's waiver
theory. The questioner must establish loss of memory on the part of the
witness, the use of a writing by a witness to refresh that memory, the
actual refreshing of the witness's memory, and an intention by the wit-
ness to use the material for the purpose of testifying. If refreshing the
memory occurred in the pretrial stage, the questioner must also show
that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice.216 The very exist-
ence of formal prerequisites to disclosure makes the application of rule
612 awkward during discovery, which is intended to function without
judicial involvement. The requirement that disclosure be necessary in
the interests of justice is particularly troubling because it makes an indi-
vidualized judicial determination unavoidable. Routine disclosures,
therefore, are impractical at the pretrial stage, which is the time when
access to the preparatory material would be most useful.217 The text of
10 (characterizing rule 612's "departure from previous practice" as "innovative"); Prucha, 76
F.R.D. at 209 (mentioning the "increasing public interest in full disclosure" as one rationale for rule
612); Foster, supra note 197, at 719-21 & n.166 (emphasizing the proviso on refreshing recollection
before testifying).
212. FED. R. EvID. 612 advisory committee's note.
213. Id.
214. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7086; see also 120 CONG. REC. 2382 (1974) (noting that "we come back to the
fact that [rule 612] does not wipe out the other sections of the law, or the law as it exists regarding
the privilege of attorney-client relationships, or their work products") (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
215. See G. WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 612.6, at 271 (1987).
216. See FED. R. EVID. 612.
217. Access to document collections is particularly useful to an opponent before trial for two
reasons. First, generalized probing about preparation is impractical in the trial setting. It does not
lend itself to a controlled, directed cross-examination, and it is unlikely to be tolerated by a judge.
Second, much of the information to be gleaned-for example, the opponent's evaluation of the
strengths and weaknesses of the case-is especially valuable during trial preparation and discovery,
both of which occur before the trial begins.
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the rule supports this interpretation, because the required disclosure is to
take place "at the hearing" and is for the purpose of cross-examination.
Some courts have concluded that rule 612 simply does not apply to depo-
sition testimony,218 but most courts have reached the opposite
conclusion. 219
As experience with this issue has increased, courts have become in-
creasingly concerned that decisions requiring disclosure were undervalu-
ing and undermining work-product protection and that rule 612 was
carrying more weight as a discovery tool than it was meant to bear.220
Several courts have simply struck a different balance among the rule 612
foundational criteria, still accepting the premise that rule 612 overcomes
the privilege.221 Other courts have subjected each document to "substan-
tial need" scrutiny under rule 26(b)(3). 222
The Third Circuit has advocated a third approach. Sporck v. Pei1223
involved a collection of preparation documents culled from hundreds of
thousands obtained in discovery. 224 The court held, with Berkey, that
the document collection was core work product.225 The court also ac-
cepted the proposition that rule 612 can overcome the work-product
privilege. However, it differed from Berkey by requiring that the propo-
nent of disclosure lay the necessary rule 612 foundation for each docu-
ment sought.226  The court implicitly rejected the idea that all
documents reviewed by a nonexpert witness are equally influential on the
resulting testimony.227 It also indicated that disclosure under rule 612
should be limited to the specific documents for which the cross-examiner
218. See, e.g., Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheller Corp., 109 F.R.D. 615, 616-17 (D.
Neb. 1986) (holding that rule 612 does not apply to discovery, but permitting opposing counsel to
ask the witness to identify any documents that aided witness's preparation).
219. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985); Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121
F.R.D. 13, 15 (D. Mass. 1988); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144-46 (D. Del.
1982); Prucha v. MPN Modem Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207, 209 (W.D. Wisc. 1977).
220. See Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 683 (D. Kan. 1986) (concluding that
rule 612 "is a rule of evidence, not a rule of discovery").
221. See Leucadia v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 678-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); A1-Rowaishan
Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Haw.), Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
222. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 119 F.R.D. 4, 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1988) (balancing the interests-of-justice standard of rule 612 with the substantial-need requirement
of rule 26(b)(3)); In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350, 353 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (concluding
that when materials have been used to refresh the memory of the witness before testifying, rule 612
encourages a finding of substantial need under rule 26(b)(3) "because of the policy in favor of effec-
tive cross-examination" ).
223. 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
224. Id. at 313.
225. Id. at 316.
226. See id. at 317-18.
227. See id. at 318.
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can demonstrate "witness use [of] the document for the purpose of testi-
fying," the second prerequisite of the rule.228
Indeed, if respondent's counsel had first elicited specific testi-
mony from petitioner, and then questioned petitioner as to which,
if any, documents informed that testimony, the work product peti-
tioner seeks to protect-counsel's opinion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the case as represented by the group identification of
documents selected by counsel-would not have been implicated.
Rather, because identification of such documents would relate to
specific substantive areas raised by respondent's counsel, respon-
dent would receive only those documents which deposing counsel,
through his own work product, was incisive enough to recognize
and question petitioner on.2 2 9
The Sporck position is sensitive to the competing doctrinal and statutory
commands. It is also sensible policy. When the underlying documents
are available to the cross-examiner, one court has said, "the only purpose
for ordering discovery [of a document collection] ... would be to inform
[the opponent] of the attorneys' process of selection and distillation of
documents." 2 30
In the decade since Judge Frankel's expansive waiver ruling in Ber-
key, courts have moved to a more particularized view of collections of
documents by requiring that each purportedly waived document meet
the relatively elaborate foundational requirements of rule 612. Neverthe-
less, both the Berkey and Sporck lines of authority coexist. Several cases
have followed Sporck,23 1 but Berkey and James Julian remain valid, cited
precedent. 232 To make matters even more complicated, Berkey and
Sporck are contrary, at least in spirit, to the line of cases holding that
inquiry into a witness's oral preparation is improper.233 The confidenti-
ality of collections of documents, therefore, remains unsettled. Last year,
in fact, the same district court followed Berkey in one case and rejected it
228. Id. at 317.
229. Id. at 318; see also Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work
Product Protection Under the Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 404-05 (1978) (arguing that there is
never a true conflict because work product does not protect purely factual matters).
230. Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D, 671, 683 (D. Kan. 1986).
231. See, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 443-44 (D. Nev. 1987); Aguinaga, 112
F.R.D. at 683-84; Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 109 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Neb.
1986).
232. See, e.g., Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and distinguishing Sporck
v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985)); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 119 F.R.D. 4, 6 (E.D.N.Y & S.D.N.Y. 1988); Laxalt, 116 F.R.D. at 443-44 (citing Berkey
Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985)).
233. See supra section II(B)(2).
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in another.2 3 4
7. Rehearsals: A Recapitulation.-Most practitioners recommend
that lawyers rehearse direct examination and cross-examination with wit-
nesses before a trial or deposition. Rehearsal is one of the most contro-
versial preparation techniques and also "the most strongly advised
among trial lawyers. ' 235 One indication of the importance that lawyers
attach to rehearsal is the large amount of time that practitioners recom-
mend be devoted to it; upper estimates, although unrealistic, range as
high as fifty or "no limit. ' 236 Even though trial lawyers are emphatic
about the need for rehearsal, they are equally concerned that thie witness
not appear rehearsed because such an impression harms the witness's
credibility. 237 Rehearsal, then, embodies much of the previously dis-
cussed conflict in the law applicable to witness preparation.
The most benign purpose for going over the prospective examina-
tions is to relax witnesses by acquainting them with the role of the wit-
ness. Rehearsal of the direct examination can supply needed confidence
for a rigorous cross.238 The technical aspects of witness preparation-
such as pausing before answers and refusing to limit an answer to yes or
no-are of particular importance, because a common technique of cross-
examiners is to rattle or anger the witness. The more substantive pur-
pose for rehearsal is to improve the witness's narrative by letting the wit-
ness know how the interrogation will proceed and what subjects will be
covered. Rehearsal also tells the lawyer what answers to expect.
If the only test for the appropriateness of rehearsal is whether it
assists perjury, there is no rational distinction between rehearsal and
other substantive preparation, such as suggesting the wording of re-
sponses.239 However, rehearsal has a greater potential for suggestiveness
than other preparation techniques. A witness naturally feels apprehen-
sive about an upcoming appearance. The inclination to welcome a script
234. Compare Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 16 (D. Mass. 1988) (criticizing Ber-
key on the grounds that requiring production whenever a deponent refreshes memory before testify-
ing destroys the distinction between refreshment during and before testifying) with In re Atlantic
Fin. Management Sec. Litig., 121 F.R.D. 141, 143 (D. Mass. 1988) (following Berkey).
235. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 13, at 233; see M. DOMBROFF, supra note 95, at
316-17 (advocating a mock interrogation of a witness); McElhaney, supra note 95, at 82-83 (discuss-
ing a witness's reading of depositions before testimony); Summit, supra note 13 (concerning the
rehearsal of witnesses for trial).
236. L. STRYKER, supra note 151, at 25; see also Summit, supra note 13, at 503-04 (noting that
"there is almost no limit to the number of sessions or hours that can be constructively devoted to
practice").
237. See, e.g., J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 214 (warning that the witness should "avoid the
rehearsed look").
238. See Summit, supra note 13, at 502.
239. See Op. No. 79, supra note 5.
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is strong. Furthermore, repetition of a story is extremely suggestive. 240
Psychologist Follingstad recommends it:
Roleplaying is one of the most important techniques for pro-
ducing desired testimony, but it requires great patience and specific
sequence of practice. While time-consuming, the benefits increase
each time roleplaying is practiced. The result of good roleplaying
is the development of new skills that appear quite natural.
Roleplaying means just that-playing or practicing behaviors
241
Inconsistencies can be conformed-often called "ironing out wrin-
kles" 242-and doubts assuaged. 243 Both can create substantial inaccu-
racy or baseless certitude.
Rehearsal is in a sense the ultimate witness-preparation technique.
It treats the trial precisely as a play scripted by the lawyers. Rehearsal
goes beyond providing factual information or documents to familiarize
the witness with the subject matter of the upcoming testimony. It is
more intensive than simply providing demeanor suggestions. Most im-
portant, it comes uncomfortably close to the line between the lawyer's
knowing what would help the case and the lawyer's advising the client
how to help the case.
C. Conclusion
Legal doctrine alternately protects and restricts witness prepara-
tion.24 4 The adversary system itself imposes on lawyers the duty to pres-
ent the best possible case for their clients. This structural imperative is
enforced through rules that require full preparation and zealous repre-
sentation and by privileges that protect preparatory activities from dis-
closure. Simultaneously, legal doctrine subjects lawyers to direct
penalties for certain improper preparation activities24 5 and provides for
disclosure of such activities to an opposing party if the preparation runs
afoul of the rules of evidence and privilege. As a result, the law applica-
240. See J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 86-87; Christiansen, supra note 143, at 706 n.9, 710.
241. Follingstad, supra note 45, at 56 (emphasis added).
242. See McElhaney, supra note 13, at 82.
243. See J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 86.
244. Saltzburg aptly describes this process as a system of incentives and limitations. See
Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 657-59.
245. Direct penalties include perjury charges against the witness, charges against the preparing
lawyer for complicity in perjury, dismissal of claims or defenses, and professional disciplinary action.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (bribery of public officials and witnesses); id. § 1505 (obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees); id. § 1621 (perjury generally); id. § 1622
(subornation of perjury); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(4) (1981) (asserting that in representing a client, "a lawyer shall not knowingly use perjured
testimony or false evidence").
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ble to witness preparation is technically complex and substantively am-
bivalent. This Article next considers whether the law relating to witness
preparation may be simplified and its goals unified.
III. Witness Preparation in the Adversary System
More than any other area of the law, witness preparation displays
the fundamental conflict between the two primary goals of the judicial
system.246 The rules designed to remedy the potentially distorting effects
of witness preparation reflect the view that the purpose of the adversary
system is to achieve an accurate application of law to facts-that the
adversary system is a truth-seeking device. On the other hand, the duty
of zealousness and the rules of privilege reflect the view that the adver-
sary system promotes and requires partisan representation, which is val-
ued for its own sake and justified even if it makes the adversary system a
poor finder of facts and applier of laws. The two schools of thought take
conflicting approaches on witness preparation. This Part begins with a
brief review of the two goals of adversary justice. It then examines in
more depth the role of witness preparation in relation to each goal.
A. Two Views of Adversary Justice
Judicial pronouncements, 247 the public perception of the function of
the judicial system,248 and ethical rules249 support the view that ascer-
taining the truth is the paramount goal of the adversarial system and the
primary basis for its legitimacy. Some observers fault the adversary sys-
tem for its lack of effectiveness as a truth-finding process. Witness prep-
aration is for them archetypal of the truth-frustrating aspects of the
adversary system. Judges Frank and Frankel and Professor Luban have
decried the lawyer's role as purveyor of half-truths or as concealers of the
246. This conflict, if overdrawn, conveys the impression that one must choose either a wholly
adversarial or a wholly "inquisitional" judicial system. See Stempel, All Stressed Up but Not Sure
Where to Go: Pondering the Teaching of Adversarialism in Law School (Book Review), 55 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 165, 186-89 (1989). This Article suggests the coexistence of conflicting goals withint the
adversary system.
247. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 601 (1989) (discussing "the truth-seeking function
of the trial"); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (holding that a defendant's right to take the
stand to commit perjury is inconsistent with "the very nature of a trial as a search for truth");
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (discussing the trial as a search for truth); In re
Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (claiming that a judgment based on truth is the "sole ultimate
objective of a trial").
248. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358, 1360-61 (1985) (arguing that the legitimacy of jury verdicts depends
on the perception that they are based on reality and not merely on evidence presented in court).
249. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1989) (noting
that a lawyer must not participate in the presentation of false evidence or in fraudulent conduct).
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truth.250 Echoing these concerns, Professors Langbein and Damaska
have argued that less partisan continental fact-finding procedures are
more likely to reach accurate results.251 Professor Landsman's interest
in the psychology of testimony and recollection leads him to recommend
fundamental changes in the relationship between lawyer and nonparty
witnesses to counteract the distorting effects of witness preparation. 252
The contrasting view is expressed in Lord Brougham's defense of
Queen Caroline: "[I]n the discharge of his duty, [a lawyer] knows but
one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons... is his first and only duty .. -253 This oft-quoted argument
may be taken as the extreme of a widely held belief that the client stands
alone at the apex of a lawyer's concerns. 254 Professor Freedman's ethical
works are other representative examples of the view that a lawyer has a
special relationship with a client as the client's protector and champion
against the state or against other individuals.255
250. See J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 86; M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 15-17 (1980); D.
LUBAN, supra note 3, at xx-xxii, 15-16.
251. See Damaska, supra note 154, at 1091-95; Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and
Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 4 Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 587-88 (1973);
Langbein, supra note 83, at 833-35.
252. See Landsman, supra note 159, at 548. Landsman advocates strict limits on lawyers' access
to nonparty witnesses and suggests that all such contacts occur under circumstances similar to those
of an informal deposition. See id. at 558-59. He also believes that experts on the psychology of
memory should be permitted to testify and that juries should receive appropriate cautionary instruc-
tions. See id. at 571-72.
253. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821), quoted in M. FREEDMAN, supra
note 14, at 9.
254. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) (emphasizing a
lawyer's duty to represent the client zealously); id. EC 74 (asserting that a lawyer "may urge any
permissible construction of the law" favorable to the client); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.1(b) (1982) (noting that a lawyer must fur-
ther a client's interests to the extent permitted); Gross, The American Advantage. The Value of
Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 745-46 (1986) (characterizing a lawyer as "a profes-
sional disputer, who will be loyal" to the client); Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 647-48 (describing the
view that a lawyer "ow[es] allegiance to the client and [is] an extreme partisan in asserting the
client's interest"). The idea of the lawyer as the champion of the client is not without its critics. See,
e.g., Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 645-47 (1985) (arguing
that a lawyer must consider the ethical implications of representing a client).
255. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 4, 9-26; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.1(b) (1982). More or less by necessity, the prac-
tical literature accepts the partisan or adversarial role of the lawyer, often to an extreme degree. The
Commentary to ABA Standard 4-1.1(b) points out that "included in the defense counsel's obliga-
tions to the client is the responsibility of furthering the defendant's interest to the fullest extent that
the law and the standards of professional conduct permit." ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.1(b) comment (1982).
Analogizing lawyers' roles in civil and criminal cases is dangerous. For numerous constitu-
tional and policy reasons, the counsel for a criminal defendant has greater leeway when confronted
with the power of the state. See Langbein, supra note 83, at 842-43; Luban, supra note 47, at 91-93;
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 543, 548-50. But see
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One may deduce from the lawyer-as-champion position that trials
are not essentially exercises in fact finding or truth seeking. Instead, they
are social and political mechanisms for resolving disputes. Truth is val-
ued, but its importance is only a part of the larger adversarial framework.
"[F]ar more than a search for truth," a trial is a vindication of the rights
of the individual and a ritual for the peaceful resolution of disputes
among members of society.256 In discussing the preparatory witness con-
ference, one commentator notes that "this essential and thoroughly pro-
fessional preparatory conference can only be taken as having nothing
whatever to do with Truth. '257 In this view, the basic legitimacy of wit-
ness preparation is rooted in the nature of adversarial fact development
and the character of the adversarial tribunal. Witness preparation is a
corollary of the protective relationship between lawyer and client; it must
be permitted even at the risk of inaccurate testimony.
Both schools of thought strongly influence the American judicial
system,2 58 and the frequently conflicting goals of truth seeking and parti-
san representation create tensions within the system. These tensions,
which are especially obvious in witness preparation, are largely responsi-
ble for the awkward and confusing position of witness preparation in our
legal system today.259
B. Justice as Accuracy
1. Half-Truths.-The adversary theory of fact finding presupposes
that the truth will best be found by the clash of two or more versions of
reality before a neutral tribunal. The parties explore the factual basis of a
case and present it to the court. The court in this model merely facili-
Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 659-61 (rejecting the view that lawyers' roles differ fundamentally in
civil and criminal cases).
256. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 2; see also G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 129 ("The real
value of the adversary system thus may not be its contribution to the truth but its contribution to the
ideal of individual autonomy."); Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 654-55 (noting that the goal of the
adversary system is not primarily to search for the truth but "to apply the substantive legal princi-
ples so that those who have rights may claim them and those who have liabilities must face them");
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,
1376 (1971) ("It would be a terrible mistake to forget that a typical lawsuit, whether civil or crimi-
nal, is only in part an objective search for historical truth. It is also, and no less importantly, a ritual
.... ").
- 257. Uviller, supra note 129, at 1073.
258. Judge Frankel, for example, would "modify (not abandon) the adversary ideal." Frankel,
supra note 129, at 1052; see also S. LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 3 (1983) ("The judicial process is generally used to satisfy two objectives: first the search
for truth, and second, the resolution of disputes between contending parties.").
259. Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 650, 687 (arguing that if goals of the adversary system were
clearer, lawyers could more easily determine the proper course of action in an ethically complex
situation).
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tates the parties' exploration and presentation. 260 Each side has a strong
incentive to discover and present all facts and arguments in its favor.26 1
The temptation to omit unfavorable evidence is balanced by the adver-
sary's incentive to rebut arguable facts, fill gaps, and refute fallacious
arguments. 262 The trier of fact then decides the matter by comparing the
"fit" of the adversaries' alternative explanations with its own
observations. 263
Because witnesses' observations are presented in support of one of
the proposed explanations, they may be unreliable. The most frequently
discussed failing of the adversary system as a truth finder might be re-
duced to the slogan that two half-truths do not make the whole truth.
Parties have no obligation to present the whole truth,2 64 and in the ordi-
nary case one party wants not to present or even discover some part of
the facts, 2 65 neither party knows the whole truth,26 6 or both. Even if the
260. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1975).
261. See Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35, 45-46 (H. Berman
rev. ed. 1972).
Saltzburg argues that the incentive to win is the "key to understanding the adversary system."
Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 659. This approach should not be confused with the "sporting" or
"fight" theories of justice, which many commentators have denounced. See J. FRANK, supra note
154, at 80-81 (discussing the "fight" theory versus the "truth" theory); R. POUND, THE CAUSES OF
POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-14 (American Judicature
Soc'y ed. 1956) (noting that "[t]he idea that procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious
disfigures our judicial administration at every point").
262. For an excellent general description of the adversary system and its traditional justifica-
tions, see G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 121-35; Fuller, supra note 261, at 30-43. As several com-
mentators have noted, however, this approach assumes that both sides have equal resources, a
premise which is often unjustified. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 254, at 609-11 (describing our society
as one "marked by grossly unequal access to legal services").
263. To use Professor Freedman's example, patients seek a second opinion in medicine because it
is useful to see whether a plausible argument can be made for a different view, regardless of whether
they perceive a defect in the original view. See Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1060, 1060-61 (1975); see also Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advo-
cacy, 37 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480-81 (describing the use of a "devil's advocate" at canoniza-
tions whose duty it is to present all possible arguments against the candidate); Levine, Scientific
Method and the Adversary Model: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 661, 674
(1974) (arguing that "[b]y laying out arguments in detail, we may be persuaded by the weight of
evidence brought to bear either in favor or against some proposition"). But see Gross, supra note
254, at 742 (concluding that the arguments for the superior accuracy of adversarial factfinding are
illogical or unproven); Youtz, Some Comments on "Scientific Method and the Adversary Model," 29
Am. PSYCHOLOGY 714, 715 (1974) (contrasting law and science in the search for facts).
264. See G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 41.
265. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 87 (noting an English lawyer's comment that "in
litigation, 'one party or the other is always supremely interested in misrepresenting, exaggerating or
suppressing the truth "'); M. FRANKEL, supra note 250, at 76 (asserting that "lawyers do indeed
spend a lot of time seeking to block or distort the truth"); Damaska, supra note 154, at 1093 (main-
taining that it may be in the interests of the parties "that some items of information ... do not reach
the adjudicator"); Frankel, supra note 129, at 1039 (describing litigators as gladiators "not primarily
crusading after truth, but seeking to win"); see also Luban, supra note 47, at 94 (noting that the
opposing lawyers are obligated "to present the facts in the manner most consistent with their client's
position" by methods that include the prevention of introduction of unfavorable evidence).
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parties know all the facts and do not want to suppress any of them, at the
very least each will emphasize some facts at the expense of others, creat-
ing a highly selective version of the truth.
Witness preparation intensifies the half-truth problem. Lawyers
commonly advise witnesses to avoid, if possible, certain factual areas in
their testimony, because opposing counsel might not think to explore
these troublesome areas. 267 Similarly, a lawyer may choose not to call a
witness because the lawyer knows from preparation that the witness has
knowledge of a sensitive area.268
In theory, the adversary system remedies this problem by providing
incentives to lawyers to fill the gaps in each other's presentations. But
there is little reason to believe that these incentives work well. First, the
incentive to present a favorable story can pressure a lawyer into creating
a favorable story or suppressing an unfavorable one.269 Second, some
experimental data suggests that the adversarial incentives work only in
the limited situation in which counsel believes that the case will be lost
and urgently needs to find something helpful. Otherwise, once a stable
view of the case emerges, diligence in fact finding declines. 270 This obser-
vation suggests that a major incentive for trial preparation is to obtain
support for an uncertain version of the facts and not to confirm a version
of the facts that appears to represent the whole truth. Witness prepara-
tion, which is part of trial preparation, interferes with truth seeking in
this way, as well.
2. Distortion of Memory.-Deliberate creation of untrue testimony
is clearly illegal and unethical; the difficult ethical problem involves what
Judge Frank has called "inadvertent but innocent witness-coaching."'27'
There is enormous pressure on a partisan advocate to produce a story
favorable to the client. The client expects a champion and presumably
266. See Uviller, supra note 129, at 1067 (concluding that, where neither side accurately knows
the facts, the adversarial process "serves as one of the better methods of reconstruction").
267. See FED. R. EVID. 611 (b) (addressing the scope of direct examination and credibility).
268. See D. SHULMAN, THE NEW APPROACH TO WINNING COMPLEX LITIGATION 916 (1983).
269. See Sheppard & Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects
of Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 320, 331 (1980).
270. See Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Non-
adversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1140-43 (1973); see also J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 28-40 (1975). The usefulness of these stud-
ies, which were conducted by psychologists using college students, has been questioned in the legal
literature. See e.g., Damaska, supra note 154, at 1095-100 (arguing that studies employing a passive
decision maker do not accurately replicate a nonadversarial system ofjustice); Gross, supra note 254,
at 740 & n.22 (arguing that college and law students are not adequate substitutes for judges and
lawyers in evaluating the roles of these professionals).
271. J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 86.
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expects success. 27 2 The competitive nature of the adversary system also
encourages lawyers to internalize the desire to win. 2 7 3 Because witness
preparation typically occurs after lawyers have committed themselves to
clients and have developed a specific adversary posture and objective,274
lawyers have strong incentives to use witness preparation to encourage a
favorable story. Witness preparation
afford[s the lawyer] the opportunity to shape the witness's testi-
mony, often to the point of recreating it in an image closer to that
which the lawyer desires than to that which the truth requires.
Ethical questions arise particularly since preparation of one's own
witness for trial is hardly, under our adversary system, a public
ceremony.275
It is entirely possible for witnesses to remain unaware that they are being
manipulated; therefore, the resulting testimony can be subjectively can-
did, but objectively wrong.276
Inadvertent pressure by lawyers is only half the problem. A witness
can be subjectively candid in providing incorrect testimony because wit-
ness preparation can distort the witness's underlying memory. Memory
is not like a phonograph record; the perception of an event does not leave
a single, clear imprint that can be replayed precisely and at will.277
272. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 250, at 63; G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 134. This charac-
teristic of the adversary system makes it attractive to participants. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER,
supra note 270, at 118-19 (1975).
273. See G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 133; see also M. FRANKEL, supra note 250, at 78 (noting
that a lawyer's personal rapport and sympathy with the client may encourage over-zealous represen-
tation); Berg, supra note 2, at 13 (characterizing the desire to win as the practitioner's "raison
d'&re"); Rhode, supra note 254, at 598 (asserting that the adversarial system often generates an
ethos that is an obstacle to truth). Other incentives include retaining "repeat customers" by acced-
ing to perjurious demands. Cf. G. HAZARD, supra note 47, at 132 (noting that repeat customers are
usually under a retainer with the attorney, creating a "dependent and intimate" relationship).
An experiment with law students showed that students who agree with the principles of the
adversary system tend to exhibit a manipulative personality profile and to use coercive, deceptive,
and manipulative interrogation techniques significantly more than their colleagues. See Stark, supra
note 4, at 419-20. Apparently, some manipulative behavior was intentional and some was not, see id.
at 419 n.20; however, the instructors had assigned the students reading materials on the legality,
ethical propriety, and tactical use of various witness preparation techniques. See id. at 415 n.10.
274. Cf. Stark, supra note 4, at 410.
275. A. LEVIN & H. CRAMER, supra note 39, at 30.
276. See Sheppard & Vidmar, supra note 269, at 328-29. The manipulative personality is called
Machiavellian (or Mach) in psychological literature.
277. See I. ROSENFIELD, THE INVENTION OF MEMORY: A NEW VIEW OF THE BRAIN 3 (1988).
This book is about a myth that has probably dominated thought ever since human
beings began to write about themselves: namely, that we can accurately remember people,
places, and things because images of them have been imprinted and permanently stored in
our brains; and that, though we may not be conscious of them, these images are the basis of
recognition and hence of thought and action.
Id. The imperfection of memory is legal common knowledge. See Gardner, supra note 151, at 401
("Imagination and suggestion are twin-artists ever ready to retouch the fading daguerreotype of
memory."); Hutchins & Sleisinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARV.
L. Riv. 860, 867-69 (1928) (discussing past recollection and present recollection revived); Kubie.
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There are, roughly speaking, three stages of memory: perception, coding
and storage, and retrieval. 278 It is generally agreed that perceptions of
eyewitnesses, for all the weight they are given, are nevertheless highly
unreliable. 279 This is initially a problem with perception itself, which is a
highly selective process and, because it is selective, subject to bias and
distortion. 280
While perceptual distortions may affect the ultimate accuracy of the
testimony, witness preparation cannot affect the original perception.
However, the same processes of selection and bias affect all subsequent
stages of memory. Witness preparation can affect the latter stages of
Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 61-66
(1959) ("What we call 'memory' actually consists of several components, each of which is vulnerable
to distortion.") .
278. See A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 13-29; Broadbent, Communication Models for Mem-
ory, in THE PATHOLOGY OF MEMORY 167, 167-71 (G. Talland & N. Waugh eds. 1969) (presenting a
model of four stages of memory: perceptual memory storing, coding or categorization, storing of
coded or categorized information, and long-term storage); Kubie, The Preconscious Factors'in the
Process of Remembering, in THE PATHOLOGY OF MEMORY 237, 242-44 (1969) (dividing psychologi-
cal processes into "ingredients"); Kubie, supra note 277, at 61-64 (concluding that the recording,
storing, and reproducing of experience are influenced by selective preconscious and unconscious
influences); Landsman, supra note 159, "at 550-53 (characterizing the stages as acquisition, retention,
and retrieval). Cf. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 64-65 (asserting that the idea that memory is a
process of recollection or reproduction of impressions is a misconception, because memory is more a
process of reconstruction).
The obvious analogy is to the function of a computer, input-storage-computation-output,
though this paradigm antedates computers. The physiological accuracy of this model of the brain
has been seriously challenged in recent years, principally by a theory called neural Darwinism pro-
posed by Gerald Edelman. See I. ROSENFIELD, supra note 277, at 156-57, 189. In Edelman's view,
memory consists of procedures and organizations of perception. The brain develops these structures
to enable it successfully to adapt (hence "Darwinism") to its environment. Memory is a reorganiza-
tion of available materials, and hence inherently unstable. See generally id. at 170-95 (providing an
accessible account of neural Darwinism).
The full implications of neural Darwinism for evaluating testimony will require further explora-
tion, but in practice it seems to provide a biological explanation of previous observations of idiosyn-
cratic perception and reconstructive memory. Indeed, Rosenfield suggests that Edelman confirms
the 1932 conclusions of F.C. Bartlett that memory is "not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed,
lifeless and fragmentary traces," but '.an imaginative reconstruction .. " Id. at 192-93 (quoting F.
BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 213 (1977)).
This view of memory tends to break down any meaningful biological distinction between perception
and memory. See id. at 135-36. Nevertheless, since the observations and not their explanation are of
primary importance here, this Article will retain the observational terminology of the traditional
model.
279. See E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 153-70 (1979).
280. If the perceiver has a stake in the outcome, awareness of this stake has an obvious biasing
effect. See M. VERNON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 206 (1962). More subtly, the perceiver,
who understands the event in terms of past experience and attitudes, may conform the perception to
fit them. See F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 33 (1977) (concluding that interests and attitudes often "direct the course and determine the
content of perceiving"); A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 13-20 (discussing the influence on percep-
tion caused by a witness's subjective expectations or physical limitations). Most perception involves
inference from the §mall part of the external event that the brain actually registers. Inference inevi-
tably introduces elements such as attitudes, personal preferences, and past experience into the per-
ception itself. See id.; see also Moore, Elements of Error in Testimony, 28 OR. L. REV. 293. 293-95
(1949) (examining the errors produced by cultural bias stereotyping).
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memory by influencing a witness's coding and storage mechanisms or by
manipulating a witness's retrieval process.
Coding and storage is not a simple process. It begins with the deci-
sion, involving hundreds of unconscious decisions, about what to store,
that is, what is significant or important.281 These decisions are also
based in part on past experience; to that extent, they will be idiosyn-
cratic. Psychologists assume that storage involves coding or categoriza-
tion of images, a process that necessarily requires further individual
selectivity and experiential bias.282 Categorization is apparently the pro-
cess that permits the correlation in stored memory of earlier and later
occurring images of a similar nature. Correlation makes retrieval of
stored memory possible,283 but it also permits the conflation of similarly
categorized memories, a process that intensifies with the passage of
time.284
Consequently, even spontaneous recollection-the third stage of
memory-generates a highly selective retrieval of images, due in large
part to the earlier categorization and labeling.28 5 An individual's per-
sonal characteristics, interests, experiences, and emotional reactions to
past and present events heavily influence recollection. 286 Such recollec-
tion contains only parts of the occurrence actually being recalled. An
individual's emotional association with the event being recalled and the
mind's importation of other elements to rationalize and organize a mem-
ory add elements from other occurrences into any single recollection. 287
281. See Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 560,
570 (1975).
282. See Kubie, supra note 277, at 64-65. Neural Darwinism holds that there are no a priori
categories of experience in the brain; therefore, perception and memory inevitably rely on other
experiences to understand and retain the one being observed, see 1. ROSENFIELD, supra note 277, at
62-63, 66, or the brain creates its own, see id. at 112-13, 155. Accordingly, neural Darwinists prefer
to think in terms of "generalization" rather than "categorization" of past experiences. See id. at 62,
64, 95.
283. See Broadbent, supra note 278, at 167-68 (maintaining that the second essential stage in
memorization is "coding or categorization"); Kubie, supra note 278, at 64-65 (discussing the process
of classifying experiences in categories as an essential step in creating memory "links"); Posner,
Representational Systems for Storing Informnation in Memory, in THE PATHOLOGY OF MEMORY,
supra note 278, at 173, 177-78 (discussing the importance of the "coding" process in memory).
284. See A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 20-24; Loftus, supra note 281, at 570-71; Posner, supra
note 283, at 176-78.
285. See Cofer, Item Retrieval and Organization in Recall, in THE PATHOLOGY OF MEMORY,
supra note 278, at 211, 218; Koestler, Abstract and Picture-Strip, in THE PATHOLOGY OF MEMORY,
supra note 278, at 261, 264-65; Kubie, supra note 278, at 237-38, 245.
286. See F. BARTLETT, supra note 280, at 213-14; I. ROSENFIELD, supra note 277, at 72-74. The
emotional associative power of the mind is, for example, a cornerstone of Freudian analysis. See id.
at 72-80.
287. See F. BARTLETT, supra note 280, at 84-89 (describing the process of rationalizing memory
by importation); I. ROSENFIELD, supra note 277, at 76-80 (asserting that there are no specific recol-
lections in our brains, but only the means for organizing past impressions).
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Recollection, in sum, is an "imaginative reconstruction" of past occur-
rences from diverse elements present in the memory. 288 Hobbes, appar-
ently, was not far wrong: "Imagination and Memory are but one thing,
which for divers considerations hath divers names. '28 9
If the unaided or undirected recollection is this malleable, the capac-
ity for influencing it is enormous. Even if asked general, neutral ques-
tions, the witness repairs incomplete perception or memory either by
pure invention or by "logical" interpolation. Apparently nonconforming
or inconvenient facts can unknowingly be suppressed, altered, or substi-
tuted.290 The preparer may subtly encourage the witness to take sides, so
that the witness's own biases will facilitate a favorable reconstruction of
the event. 291 Even without partisan motivations, people commonly try to
please their audience. Thus, the witness will try to please the lawyer
during witness preparation, who in turn will further encourage and rein-
force the helpful tendencies in the witness's story.292
Studies of interrogation techniques have uniformly demonstrated
the distorting effects of suggestive questioning. Recollection is largely in
the control of the pretrial interrogator, who can determine the areas of
memory that will be called upon and suggest the contents of that mem-
ory.2 9 3 Distortion can occur along two axes: the substantive content of
the memory and the certainty with which the memory is held.294 The
second is as dangerous as the first. If the facts are in dispute, their reso-
lution may be much easier if witnesses on one side recognize and commu-
288. F. BARTLETr, supra note 280, at 213-14 (emphasis added); see also M. FREEDMAN, supra
note 14, at 65-68 (describing the process of remembering as a creative reconstruction which can be
influenced by the form of the question asked and the witness's perception of what is in the witness's
best interest); Koestler, supra note 285, at 265 ("Recalling the experience requires dressing it up
again."); Kubie, supra note 278, at 238 (noting that the underlying process of remembering is carried
on preconsciously by rejecting or forgetting selected data).
289. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 14 (Oxford ed. 1958) (1651). Bartlett also suggested that remem-
bering and imagining are closely identified. See F. BARTLETT, supra note 280, at 13, 312-13.
290. See Damaska, supra note 154, at 1094. Freedman gives the example of John Dean, who
during the Watergate hearings relocated a meeting from the Mayflower Doughnut Coffee Shop in
the Statler Hilton Hotel to the Mayflower Hotel, even though he had every incentive to be accurate.
See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 66. Kubie reports that Charles Darwin found that he often
forgot evidence that seemed to argue against his theories. See Kubie, supra note 277, at 68.
291. See 2 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS §§ 528-529 (1959); see also J. FRANK,
supra note 154, at 86 (discussing "inadvertent but innocent witness-coaching"). Indeed, mollifying
the witness and developing a good rapport-part of which involves convincing the witness of the
justness of the client's cause-is an essential function of witness preparation. See J. SONSTENG,
supra note 95, at 21; see also G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 13, at 231 ("The relationship
between counsel and the witness becomes a central element of what is presented at trial.").
292. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 67; A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 26-29.
293. See Landsman, supra note 159, at 554-56. According to one commentator, "Imagination
and suggestion are twin-artists ever ready to retouch the fading daguerreotype of memory." Gard-
ner, supra note 151, at 401.
294. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 67-68; Marcus, supra note 57, at 1644 & n.205.
332
Vol. 68:277, 1989
Witness Preparation
nicate the uncertainty of their recollections. Presuppositions or
assumptions in questions, even if entirely baseless, are remarkably suc-
cessful in creating new, false recollections. 295 For example, using "the"
instead of "a" in the question "Did you see the train?" can induce en-
tirely false recollections of the train's existence or increase the certainty
of related details. 296 Similarly, use of the word "smashed" instead of
"hit" can increase the reported speeds of colliding automobiles. 297 A
"memory" created in this way can become permanent, and the witness
may strongly believe that it is absolutely true, making successful cross-
examination far more difficult.298
Suggestive interrogation of witnesses for the purpose of witness
preparation may be the rule rather than the exception. One study has
shown that law students committed to the adversary system will attempt
it.299 The author of a witness-preparation handbook frankly acknowl-
edges the effect of witness preparation:
There is no doubt that this exercise will have an impact upon
the witness's testimony. Witness preparation has the effect of
shaping the testimony, focusing on the significant, dropping the
irrelevant, emphasizing helpful points, and structuring the presen-
tation to minimize the damage caused by adverse information. 300
These are the traditional justifications for witness preparation, and stated
this way, they seem innocuous enough. But as the passage continues, the
less attractive side of witness preparation becomes apparent:
This is the process envisioned by the adversary system. It is not
your job to bring all the facts to the attention of the jury, nor is it
your duty to play an impartial role.... [Y]our emphasis in witness
preparation should be designed to present the facts in the light
most favorable to your side.30 1
The result of witness preparation, in other words, can be something
much more substantively convenient and certain than the witness's origi-
nal memory warrants.
Distortion of witness recollection is a serious problem partially be-
cause it is often not recognized as a problem. Practitioners, who ought to
be in the best position to confront the problem, tend either to dismiss it-
295. See Loftus, supra note 281, at 563, 571; see also Gardner, supra note 151, at 403-05.
296. See Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Dec. 1974, at 116, 118.
297. See id. at 117-19; Loftus & Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony The Influence ofthe Wording of a
Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 86, 88 (1975).
298. See J. FRANK, supra note 154, at 86; A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 27-29; Damaska,
supra note 154, at 1094; Sheppard & Vidmar, supra note 269, at 322, 329.
299. See Stark, supra note 4, at 416-20.
300. J. KE-SrLER, supra note 3, § 9.14, at 332.
301. Id.
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calling the problem "self-limiting" 302--- or to assume an easy answer-
concluding "the ethical lawyer.., will naturally... guide [the] client
toward the avoidance of incorrect recollection and characterization. ' 30 3
Thus, the practical literature either ignores the problem or raises the is-
sue and merely exhorts readers to be ethical.3°4 Worse, much of the
practical literature emphasizes a truthful "manner" or the "appearance"
of candor.30 5 Even though these texts without exception advise that the
witness should also be, in fact, truthful and candid, there is more than a
hint here of the Machiavellian principle that one should be virtuous, but
failing that, appear virtuous.30 6
In two significant respects, presentation of half-truths and the dis-
tortion of memory, witness preparation seriously undermines the impor-
tant truth-seeking goals of the adversary system. Moreover, both
problems inhere in witness preparation that is entirely legal and ethical.
Accordingly, those who identify accuracy as the primary goal of the judi-
cial system have ample reason to seek to limit witness preparation to the
extent possible.
C. Justice as Advocacy
The adherents of the partisan-representation school of thought rec-
ognize the truth-frustrating aspects of the judicial system, but they con-
clude that such results are inherent in an adversarial system. As
previously discussed, the adversary system furthers other goals-such as
autonomy and vigorous representation-that many observers value more
highly than accuracy. This subpart discusses the two principal structural
302. McElhaney, supra note 13, at 84.
303. Summit, supra note 13, at 505 (emphasis added).
304. McElhaney speaks of "ironing out" difficulties in testimony, but warns against "polishing."
McElhaney, supra note 13, at 82.
305. See, e.g., M. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON UNFAIR TACTICS 86-87 (2d ed. 1988) (recom-
mending that counsel brief the witness on "over-all parameters of the deposition and substantive
questions which may be expected"); I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE 266 (1935) (noting that
rehearsing will allow a witness to testify in "an easy, natural and favorable manner"); J. KESTLER,
supra note 3, at 330, 332 n.55 ("It is crucial to create a proper image of trustworthiness."); J. SON-
STENG, supra note 95, at 22, 213 (providing examples of how to make the witness appear honest);
Parnell, supra note 44, at 54 (suggesting that selection of witnesses be based on whether "they can
give an impression of trust and sincerity").
306. See N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 65 (Modern Library ed. 1950) (1513).
It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to have all the above-named qualities [faith
and integrity], but it is very necessary to seem to have them. I would even be bold to say
that to possess them and always to observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess
them is useful.
Id.
One striking example, Dombroffon Unfair Tactics, purports to be a guide to combatting unfair
tactics, but often reads more like a road map to their effective use. See M. DOMBROFF, supra note
305, at 44-45, 53, 71, 131, 134; see also Rieger, supra note 148, at 1439 (criticizing Dombroff's book
for focusing on purely tactical issues without considering the underlying ethical problems).
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characteristics of the American judicial system that appear to necessitate
witness preparation. 30 7
1. The Passive Tribunal.-The tribunal in the adversary system
comes "to the hearing with an open and neutral mind, ' 30 8 ignorant of the
facts and circumstances of the case it is to decide. From the tribunal's
point of view, this system demands that the parties present all the evi-
dence needed to reach a decision anyway. The tribunal has little power
to gather information on its own and usually does not know enough
about the case to investigate competently. The parties have more infor-
mation about the transaction than the tribunal ever will. This character-
istic necessitates and encourages complete and zealous fact gathering,
because each side is eager to discover as much favorable information as
possible to present to the tribunal.30 9
The adversarial lawyer must first choose what will be presented to
the court-which elements of proof and which witnesses. The lawyer
must then prepare the chosen witnesses to ensure that they present rele-
vant facts and that their presentation is coherent and organized.3 10 The
lawyers, rather than the court, must decide in the first instance what is
relevant. 31' The court can decide relevance only negatively and only
within the universe of facts presented by the parties.
A lawyer cannot simply gather vaguely relevant material, throw it
into a basket, and hand it to the court. Even if the tribunal could afford
the time for such a presentation, a naive trier of fact would in many cases
be unable to sort it out.312 Assisting the trier of fact by sifting and ar-
ranging the facts is most important in cases tried to juries, who may be
less adept at understanding and analyzing complicated factual situations
than judges. But to some degree, sifting and arranging are essential in all
cases. Simplification of even the most complex case to a very few basic
307. But see Schwartzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U.
Pn-r. L. REV. 703, 707-11, 716 (1989) (challenging the current relevance of these characteristics).
308. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981). See generally Fuller,
supra note 261, at 35-48 (discussing the philosophy of adjudication); Landsman, supra note 258, at 2-
51 (providing a brief history and analysis of the adversary system).
The structure of the adversary system may also be expressed in terms of control over the evi-
dence presented. The adversary system gives a high degree of control to the parties, while continen-
tal systems place control in the hands of the tribunal. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, supra note
270, at 24-27, 118-19.
309. This description may not always be accurate in practice. See supra text accompanying
notes 269-270.
310. See People v. Pendleton, 75 II1. App. 3d 580, 594, 394 N.E.2d 496, 506 (1979); M. FREED-
MAN, supra note 14, at 68; D. SHULMAN, supra note 268, at 916-24.
311. See United States v. Ouimette, 753 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1985).
312. See Frankel, supra note 129, at 1041-45.
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themes-to "a single sentence," one writer commands313-can create a
clear presentation that is ultimately more persuasive. To achieve this
level of organization, lawyers must control witnesses on direct examina-
tion. Lacking the powerful tool of leading questions on direct, such con-
trol is virtually impossible without prior preparation.
What is true of coherence is also true of accuracy. When the trans-
action at issue is complex, a witness will require some assistance to recall
events correctly. Completeness and accuracy of testimony can be as-
sured only by pretestimony review, that is, witness preparation. Re-
turning to the Iran-Contra example, Sullivan would have done an
enormous disservice both to his client and to the committees if he had let
North testify without extensive preparation. Without preparation, North
would have recalled far less information with far less accuracy. 314 As
Sullivan and North repeatedly asserted, preparation was as essential to
the committees' fact-finding goals as it was to North's desire to be a per-
suasive, believable witness. 315
Another prominent feature of the adversarial fact-finding process is
that trial is a continuous event. Weeks, months, or years of preparation
are compressed into a relatively brief presentation by each party. The
trial, therefore, is a fundamentally theatrical event, in the sense that its
outcome depends on the quality of the presentations of the parties, as
well as the underlying merits of the dispute.316 Spontaneous recounting
of an event, especially a complex one, is not feasible. One judge advises
lawyers,
Like the rest of us, [witnesses] lose memory with time, become
emotionally involved with what happened and recount events ac-
cordingly. They have trouble organizing their thoughts into rele-
vant and coherent categories and have difficulty verbalizing their
recollections. If counsel puts a witness on the stand without ade-
313. D. SHULMAN, supra note 268, at 101.
314. A different view is exemplified by the majority in the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1989). The Court upheld a trial court's refusal to permit a
defendant to consult his attorney between direct examination and cross-examination. Id. at 602.
The majority believed that cross-examining the witness after direct examination, without the benefit
of his attorney's advice, better serves "the truth-seeking function of the trial." Id. at 601. The
dissent argued that a relaxed, composed witness is more likely to be accurate. See id. at 605-07.
315. See Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-4, 238.
316. Aron & Rosner begin their book, How to Prepare a Witness for Trial, with this theatrical
analogy. See R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 3-4, 263; see also J. SONSTENG, supra note 95,
at 27 (stating that "the attorney directs this play using actors and actresses as witnesses"); Summit,
supra note 13, at 504 (referring to notes and files as "props").
The Supreme Court in Geders v. United States emphatically rejected the notion that the judge is
a mere moderator and the trial a play. 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1975). The Court is clearly correct, but it
attacks a straw man. The Court did not deny, nor could it, that the vast bulk of the responsibility for
substantive development of the case rests with counsel and not the court. See id.
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quate preparation, the testimony will suffer from theseinfirmities . 3 17
Common sense suggests that, to improve recollection, witnesses should
think carefully about the substance of the testimony before testifying.
This careful consideration is the function of witness preparation. Judge
Frankel has rightly questioned "our rigid insistence that the parties con-
trol the evidence until it is all 'prepared' and packaged for competitive
manipulation at the eventual continuous trial, ' 31 8 but the continuous na-
ture of trial makes packaging and preparation a necessity. 3 19
Professor Landsman recommends that the ill effects of witness prep-
aration be remedied by permitting counsel to interview nonparty wit-
nesses only under deposition-like conditions. 320 Landsman wisely
sidesteps the obvious attorney-client privilege problem by omitting par-
ties and clients from his plan, but this omission means that it is a remedy
of limited effect. Even in its narrow application, the Landsman proce-
dure assumes that because thorough witness preparation involves only a
lawyer's questions and a witness's answers, it is amenable to a quasi-
public, recorded setting. In fact, much of the reality and value of witness
preparation involves assisting the witness to reconstruct what oc-
curred;32' it requires the testing of hypotheses against other sources of
facts, prior statements, other witnesses' statements, or documents.322
Before and after Hickman, courts have recognized that witness prepara-
tion requires privacy.323 Even if a lawyer was willing to go through this
317. Steingass, A Judge's 10 Tips on Courtroom Success, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 68, 70.
318. Frankel, supra note 129, at 1054.
319. Under the continental alternative, in which the fact finder gathers and sorts out the evi-
dence on its own, the tribunal remains involved over a long period of time and the proceeding tends
to move slowly. See Landsman, supra note 258, at 49. While this approach improves the fact
finder's familiarity with the case and enhances the ability of the fact finder to develop its own views
about the facts, it is a process wholly unsuited to the adversary system as we know it.
320. See Landsman, supra note 159, at 556-65. He also suggests cautionary jury instructions, see
id. at 571, and routine admission of expert psychological testimony on the subject of witness memory
and its distortion. See id. at 564 n.96, 572. The latter suggestion is obviously unfeasible. Trials
would involve an endless array of psychological experts, whose presentations would make trials
extremely complicated.
The length, complexity, and expense of trials would dramatically increase. The jury, already
struggling to comprehend substantive legal rules that lawyers and law professors barely understand
and substantive factual issues that experts disagree on must come to grips with psychological theory
(as to which the parties will, no doubt, present opposing viewpoints) and even more instructions
from the judge.
321. Reconstruction, of course, is also the process that makes recollection subject to bias. See
supra text accompanying notes 288-289.
322. Saltzburg criticizes the Landsman proposal because it inhibits early, informal investigation;
discourages free, candid discussion by witnesses; and sacrifices the important benefits of well-pre-
pared witnesses. See Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 685-86.
323. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 208-10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922
(1976) (concluding that counsel ordinarily wants to and is entitled to interview non-client witnesses
in private). Lawyers unquestionably expect private interviews with non-client witnesses. See, e.g.,
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process on the record, a likelihood that is vanishingly small, a transcript
of such a session would be utterly misleading. Without any intent to
deceive, several contradictory versions of the same events would appear,
giving a future cross-examiner a field day. This result would discourage
lawyers from thoroughly preparing witnesses, as Hickman predicted.
Trials would be longer and less comprehensible, containing less intelli-
gent testimony from incompletely informed witnesses.
2. Partisan Fact Development.-The partisan advocate's job re-
quires more than gathering facts for the tribunal. The lawyer, as the
servant of one of the parties, must put a great deal of effort into the
development and presentation of the facts to persuade the tribunal of the
justness of the client's cause. The adversary system's pressure to prepare
witnesses comes not only from the representative role of the lawyer and
the client's expectations that flow from it, but also from a pragmatic as-
sessment of the opponent's likely actions in such a system. Since partisan
preparation is permitted, one must assume that the other side will engage
in it.324 The preparation that is an institutional necessity in relation to
the trier of fact is also a strategic duty in relation to the client.
In preparing to advise the client, a lawyer's first responsibility is to
conduct a complete investigation. 325 This factual inquiry may include a
myriad of activities. At the core of the inquiry, the lawyer must probe
the memories of all potential witnesses to ensure complete recollection of
the relevant facts. Some commentators have suggested that there is a
conflict between accuracy and completeness in memory. 326 A minimally
prompted recollection is least distorted, but completeness requires exten-
sive questioning, which is inevitably suggestive and distorting. To the
extent that this conflict exists, concern with accuracy will result in less
witness preparation, and concern with completeness will result in more
witness preparation. The adversary system effectively drives the choice
Berg, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that witness preparation takes place "[i]n the privacy of our of-
fices"); Frampton, supra note 12, at 33 (describing custom of one-on-one preparation between gov-
ernment witness and prosecutor, with no written records kept).
324. The intuitive view that an unprepared side would be at a disadvantage is supported by a
study showing that when one side prepared and presented its case in a client-centered (partisan or
adversarial) manner and the other side in a court-centered (outcome-neutral) manner, the client-
centered side prevailed. See Lind, Thibaut & Walker, supra note 270, at 1142. However, there was
little difference between the two types of approaches with respect to diligence of preparation, except
that client-centered lawyers who appeared to be losing sought additional facts. See id. at 1140-41.
325. For a discussion of a lawyer's responsibility to adequately prepare for the client, see MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 6-4 (1981). As discussed in Part II, the legal carrot to encourage adequate preparation is
the secrecy surrounding witness preparation, and the stick is the requirement of zealous and compe-
tent representation.
326. See Loftus & Zanni, supra note 297, at 86; supra text accompanying notes 271-306.
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toward completeness. Doctrinally, thorough preparation is an affirma-
tive ethical obligation, while inaccurate testimony is often untestable and
punishable only if knowingly induced. Structurally, the partisan advo-
cate's role is not to present a balanced picture of the case but to develop
the facts to persuade a neutral and naive tribunal.
Under these circumstances it is unrealistic to think that witness
preparation could consist merely of eliciting the witness's narrative or
that it could resemble the direct examination of a witness at trial. Recog-
nition is greater than recall. When asked to remember something they
have observed, people respond with far less detail and certainty than
when asked to confirm or deny an observation. 327 In addition, memory
functions best when a person relives the event. 328 If narratives or bland
general inquiries are unlikely to distort, they are also unlikely to stir rec-
ognition or to focus a witness's attention upon the specific event.329 A
lawyer who wants to discover all that can reasonably be learned about
the case cannot take the chance that important facts will be missed in a
general interrogation. The lawyer familiar with the case is in an ideal
position to explore the witness's knowledge by providing the materials
that will help stimulate a more complete recollection of a transaction.
Having learned enough about the case to advise the client, the law-
yer must fulfill a second duty-presenting the client's case persua-
sively.330 Counsel in the adversary system must educate and persuade
the naive tribunal in a compressed period of time. At a minimum the
lawyer is "entitled to help place the witness' testimony in a light
327. See F. BARTLETT, supra note 280, at 195; Cofer, supra note 285, at 218-19; Loftus & Zanni,
supra note 297, at 86.
328. See Koestler, supra note 285, at 263-64 (describing the process by which a fragmentary
image can have "uncanny evocative power"). See generally F. BARTLETT, supra note 280, at 207
("When a subject is being asked to remember, very often the first thing that emerges is something of
the nature of attitude. The recall is then a construction, made largely on the basis of this attitude.");
A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 24 (providing a summary of memory processes).
329. See A. TRANKELL, supra note 93, at 22. An interesting example of neutral use of leading
questions is Pediatric Telephone Advice, a handbook for pediatricians' offices for handling telephone
calls from concerned parents. See B. SCHMITT, PEDIATRIC TELEPHONE ADVICE 25-270 (1980).
Clearly, the user's central concern is to obtain information that is as accurate as possible. One can
hardly find a direct question in the book. For example, in the case of a coma, the parent is asked
these clearly leading questions:
1. Is there any possibility of a head injury or neck injury? ...
2. Is there any chance of poisoning or a drug overdose? ...
3. Is there any chance your child was just stung by a bee or wasp? ...
4. Is your child's breathing very slow and weak? Are your child's lips or skin bluish or
dusky?
Id. at 32.
330. See supra note 254. Presentation of the case generally occurs after the initial investigation,
but the two processes may overlap. Settlement discussions with the opponent. for example, may take
place during discovery.
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favorable to the client" 331 and to make the testimony at trial clear and
persuasive, regardless of the natural articulateness of the witnesses. 332
To present an effective case, the person responsible for obtaining and
presenting the facts to the tribunal must organize them in a convincing
way. The decision whether certain witnesses will testify depends on the
lawyer's evaluation of each witness's credibility and persuasiveness dur-
ing witness preparation. 333
Similarly, the orderly development and presentation of the case
through the testimony of several witnesses and within the testimony of a
particular witness are important both for simple coherence and for per-
suasive effect. 334 "[O]rdering ... the prospective proofs, organizing,
aligning, and marshaling empirical data with the view to combative em-
ployment ... is the hallmark of the adversary enterprise. ' 335 Certain
types of presentation-for example, a chronological narrative-are par-
ticularly effective in aiding comprehension; others-for example, build-
ing to a climax-are particularly suited for persuasion. 336 Obviously, a
presentation structured on the basis of these principles is anything but
natural or spontaneous, but an attorney would be remiss in not present-
ing the evidence in a manner that is comprehensible and compelling to
the tribunal. 337
In sum, neither completeness nor persuasion can be achieved by a
passive advocate. Lawyers must choose the context in which to present
witnesses' testimony, and they must also teach the witnesses how to pres-
ent their testimony most effectively. Remaining well within existing ethi-
cal boundaries, the lawyer can suggest to a witness which points to
emphasize, which to avoid unless directly asked ("don't volunteer" is the
331. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 13, at 357.
332. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 62.
333. See J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 211-12.
334. See, e.g., R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 151-52 (emphasizing the importance of
order in presenting witnesses); D. SHULMAN, supra note 268, at 1201-13 (advising lawyers to place a
strong witness on the stand first and to present the client as a witness as late as possible in the case);
Hanley, supra note 93, at 477-78 (arguing that success depends on preparation and presentation of
witnesses and on order of presentation).
335. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (asserting that proper presentation of a client's case
demands that the attorney assemble information and sift through the facts to prepare legal theories
without undue and needless interference). A less edifying-but no less legitimate-goal is to "bury
the adverse witness in the middle of [the] case." Hanley, supra note 93, at 480.
336. See J. SONSTENG, supra note 95, at 27 (describing a trial as a play directed by the attorney
"using actors and actresses as witnesses who perform for an audience composed of the jury and
judge"); McElhaney, supra note 13, at 83 (advising a lawyer who is "planning to save some powerful
piece of evidence" for the end of the testimony to tell the witness not to "blurt out the climax at the
very beginning").
337. See supra text accompanying notes 95-109.
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watchword of much preparation), and how best to describe or character-
ize events or actions. Levin and Cramer explain:
[One might assume] that the witness has command of the sub-
stance of his testimony and the vocabulary with which to express
it. The assumption is, of course, totally unwarranted. Witnesses,
without any intention of falsifying, exaggerate speed, lengthen or
fore-shorten time, and otherwise "shade the details" of a case to an
extent which must inevitably hurt their own cause. Other wit-
nesses, far from dealing in hyperbole, are so lacking in imagery and
verbal skills that they can hardly describe an event. Unaided, they
may fail totally to communicate the significance of their
experience.
These very facts, as we have seen, impose upon the attorney
the obligation to aid the witness. 338
It is, therefore, impossible to avoid detailed discussion of the substance of
prospective witnesses' testimony if each side is to present a coherent and
persuasive case.
D. Conclusion
Witness preparation presents lawyers with difficult ethical problems
because it straddles the deeper tension within the adversary system be-
tween truth seeking and partisan representation. Witness preparation
may foster inaccuracy by introducing distortion into a witness's testi-
mony, but it also promotes accuracy when it is used to clarify complex or
ill-recalled events. Witness preparation is a child of the adversary sys-
tem-an inevitable outgrowth of its structure339-and like its parent em-
braces both truth seeking and partisan representation.
IV. Toward a Resolution of the Witness-Preparation Problem
The witness-preparation problem, as discussed in this Article, has
two parts. First, the applicable legal doctrine is complex and ambivalent.
Second, the doctrinal complexity and ambivalence reflects a tension
within the fundamental structure of the adversary system. It is impor-
tant to recognize that the arguments in Part III for and against witness
preparation do not exactly answer each other. Most critics of witness
preparation point to its distorting effects on testimonial accuracy. Its
supporters reject the primacy of accuracy or point to the value of witness
preparation in creating a clear and persuasive adversarial presentation.
338. A. LEVIN & H. CRAMER, supra note 39, at 30.
339. Cf. Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary System, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 362-63 (1981)
(arguing that Judge Frankel's criticism of the adversary system-that it sacrifices the pursuit of
truth-goes to its structure and not to its ethical rules).
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The critics emphasize outcome, while the supporters emphasize process
and structure. At first glance, it seems that these very different perspec-
tives make a general approach to resolving witness-preparation questions
impossible. In fact, the opposite may be true.
Professor Luban has suggested that the adversary system has a wide
and a narrow sense.340 In the wide sense, partisanship has its own value.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the adversary system in the wide sense
can be used to justify what Luban calls ruthless behavior-that is, ag-
gressive partisanship bordering on the unethical or illegal. In the narrow
sense, the adversary system is simply a structure and resulting proce-
dures. The narrow sense creates no imperative to follow the adversarial
nature of the system to its logical conclusion-that truth seeking is essen-
tially irrelevant.341 Rather, the adversary system's structure necessitates
some departures from truth seeking and other judicial goals, but within
that structure exists the flexibility to pursue those goals.
The distinction between the adversary system as ideology and as
structure provides the framework for an approach to the witness-prepa-
ration problem. Witness preparation is justified when the narrow version
of the adversary system necessitates it. Witness preparation's distorting
effects on testimony are not justified when witness preparation is merely
a reflection of partisanship and competitiveness for their own sakes. For
example, because the structure of the adversary system requires partisan
presentation of a case, some preparatory activities are essential to a co-
herent and persuasive presentation. Thus, a rigid rule banning all pre-
trial contacts with witnesses would reduce distortion but would be
incompatible with the adversary structure that demands that the parties
develop the facts. The goal in evaluating a particular witness-prepara-
tion technique used with a particular type of witness must involve an
assessment of the adversarial implications. Witness preparation should
be channeled into those methods that permit partisan case development
but present the least threat of impaired fact finding.
Two kinds of rules, ethical and procedural, affect witness prepara-
tion practices. A lawyer has an ethical duty, based on the structure of
the adversary system, to understand a client's case as fully as possible
and to present it as persuasively as possible. Because virtually all witness
preparation has distorting effects on testimony, preparation should be
340. See Luban, supra note 47, at 90-91. Professor Luban, however, would probably go on to
say that the adversary system, even in its narrow sense, is not justified just because it is there. Its
mere existence does not necessarily demonstrate the morality of the adversary system or of witness
preparation. See id. at 111-18.
341. Cf. Martone, Adversary Adjudication on Trial, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 227, 233-34 (1989) ("the
adversary system is not essential for the truth finding process").
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limited to the minimum necessary to fulfill the lawyer's ethical responsi-
bility. The lawyer must be able to obtain information, clarify important
points, expose or resolve misperceptions, and organize the presentation
of the case. Beyond that, polishing, scripting, and rehearsing (especially
repeated rehearsing) seem undesirable. A witness should be calm and in
command of the subject matter of the expected testimony, but invulnera-
bility is neither a realistic expectation nor in most cases an accurate re-
flection of the witness's knowledge.
The lawyer's negative ethical duty-not knowingly to mislead the
tribunal-is less easy to apply to witness preparation practices. None of
the practices identified in Part II necessarily result in false testimony,
and all can be justified as enhancing accuracy in some or most cases.
Therefore, the ethical prohibition must turn on the question whether the
lawyer knows of the falsity of the resulting testimony. Because such
knowledge is difficult to quantify and to prove,342 the prohibition on
knowingly presenting false testimony is not likely to be a helpful guide to
appropriate witness preparation, as the reaction to Opinion No. 79 dem-
onstrates.343 Moreover, knowingly presenting false testimony ought to
be extreme conduct that witness preparation should ordinarily not ap-
proach. The ethical lawyer should not feel free to engage in any witness
preparation activity short of actually countenancing perjury.
Procedural rules hold out more promise for balancing the lawyer's
responsibilities. Procedural rules can be designed to turn on more objec-
tive criteria than a lawyer's state of mind or the potential effects of subtle
suggestion. Consequently, procedural rules are more easily understood
and enforced. Three witness-preparation situations previously discussed
in this Article will serve to demonstrate this approach: (1) Colonel
North's use of notebooks containing selected non-privileged documents
while preparing for testimony, (2) the discovery of material supplied to
expert witnesses in Berkey, and (3) the group preparation of prosecution
witnesses in United States v. Ebens.344
A. Collections of Non-Privileged Documents
One can speculate that Colonel North's notebooks contained,
among other things, some of the documents provided by or available to
the congressional investigators. North's lawyers probably selected and
organized those documents according to their view of the documents'
significance for North's defense. North undoubtedly reviewed and dis-
342. See supra text accompanying notes 120-125.
343. See supra text accompanying note 8.
344. 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986).
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cussed the documents extensively with counsel before appearing before
the committees. 345 The. selection and use of the documents in prepara-
tion for testimony, therefore, constitutes the most sensitive kind of legal
work. The resulting collection represented core work product and re-
flected attorney-client communications. 346
A sweeping waiver by rule 612 of the protection afforded to this
collection of documents should be inferred only with great caution. As
Professor Marcus and others have pointed out, since this preparation
technique clearly does not constitute voluntary exposure or voluntary
risk of exposure, the idea of waiver is itself inapt. Rather, applying rule
612 to require disclosure simply elevates rule 612 above the rules provid-
ing privacy for witness preparation, a result that seems to have little sup-
port in the text or legislative history of rule 612.347 Doctrinally, the issue
is a stand-off.
A look at the adversarial process presents a clearer choice. Review
of relevant documents has distinct advantages for the quality of a wit-
ness's testimony. It is precisely the kind of preparation that should be
encouraged. It enormously enhances the completeness, accuracy, and
coherence of the testimony, as North and Sullivan said repeatedly. 348
Moreover, use of the pertinent documents themselves affords little op-
portunity for distortion, because their contents cannot change to the de-
gree that unsupported memory can; partisan flights of fancy are firmly
tethered by the documents themselves. Moreover, distortion is largely
remediable by the diligent efforts of opposing counsel, who has access to
the underlying documents, as Sporck recognized. 349
The greatest problem with permitting discovery of these compila-
tions is not that counsel will forego review of important documents with
witnesses-some familiarity with the relevant documents will always be
essential-but rather that a different technique for review will be em-
ployed. The cautious lawyer, in light of the Berkey decision requiring
disclosure in most situations, should assume that all preparation material
will be revealed. Because rules 23(b)(3) and 612 apply only to written
materials and because the courts have strictly protected from disclosure
preparation activities that constitute oral work product,350 the obvious
345. The present discussion focuses on preparatory use of a presumed collection of discoverable
documents. Other materials in the notebooks-for example, North's own notes-are treated only in
passing. Similarly, North's consulting the materials during testimony makes the case for disclosure
far more compelling.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 188-194.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 196-215.
348. See Iran-Contra Hearings, supra note 1, at 237-41.
349. 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
350. See supra notes 62-64, 196-234 and accompanying text.
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alternative is to prepare witnesses by describing but not showing the rele-
vant documents to them.351 Indeed, some courts, in requiring disclosure
of materials reviewed during preparation, have suggested that the "so-
phisticated prospective witness [would] ...use a 'coach' who has ex-
amined the documents, rather than the documents themselves. '352
Oral description of documents is the worst possible type of witness
preparation for the legal system to encourage. First, preparation that is
done orally does not reduce the risk of distorting memory.353 Quite the
contrary, there is a great likelihood that any oral description of a docu-
ment would be, to some degree, inaccurate. The lawyer would undoubt-
edly introduce biases, for example, by minimizing the significance of a
document because the lawyer wishes it minimized. Without the docu-
ment in hand, the witness has little choice but to agree with that charac-
terization. Consequently, any further interpretation of the document by
the witness will likely stray far from the truth. Unnecessary inaccuracy
of this kind provides little support to the witness-who may be brought
up short on cross-examination-and constitutes a disservice to the
tribunal.
Second, oral preparation is likely to be incomplete preparation. Re-
lying on only oral discussion, the witness may be surprised during testi-
mony by a particular turn of a phrase, by the context or placement of a
point in the document, or by material that was simply not discussed.
Careful review of the actual document by the witness would frequently
correct this problem. It would also enable the witness to assist the law-
yer by noticing points about the document that the lawyer may have
missed. In all likelihood, the witness will be more familiar with the cir-
cumstances under which the document was written. Education of the
lawyer is, after all, an important part of witness preparation, and it
makes no sense to deprive the lawyer of this source of information.
Finally, penalizing written preparation tends to favor those parties
with the resources to spend the extra time to meet face-to-face with wit-
nesses or the extra resources to create special, "sanitized" collections of
documents for review by witnesses. 354 Litigation favors the wealthy liti-
351. See R. ARON & J. ROSNER, supra note 2, at 69 (Supp. 1988); J. KESTLER, supra note 3, at
336; Summit, supra note 13, at 57; Solovy & Byman, Rule 612 and Work-Product Usage in the
Preparation ofTestimony, Nat'l L.J., June 10, 1985, at 28, col. 3, 29 col. 1.
352. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps, Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.2 (W.D. Mo.
1980); see also Barrer v. Women's Nat'l Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 204 n.1 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that to
protect against disclosure, a lawyer should simply not allow a client to review a document prior to
testifying).
353. See Marcus, supra note 57, at 1646-47 (noting that "the intensity of face-to-face preparation
may foster shading of testimony").
354. See id. at 1613-14, 1644.
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gant enough as it is,355 without conferring this additional advantage.
There is an alternative to both wholesale disclosure and complete
secrecy. Just as Professor Marcus recommended borrowing the "particu-
larized need" standard from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
(relating to the secrecy of grand jury material) for disclosure of privileged
documents, 356 rule 6(e) can also be borrowed for collections of non-privi-
leged documents. A line of cases in the District of Columbia Circuit has
addressed the problem of applying rule 6(e) to collections of otherwise
discoverable documents. The court took as axiomatic that submission of
documents to a grand jury does not immunize them from all future dis-
covery. The issue is what future discovery may occur without disclosing
matters occurring before the grand jury. The court has arrived at an
elegant, predictive, and highly practical rule: only the production of
grand jury documents as such is prohibited; the documents themselves
remain independently discoverable.
In the first of the cases, a Securities and Exchange Commission sub-
poena for documents that had previously been presented to a grand jury
was upheld because the agency had valid, independent grounds for re-
questing the documents-there was no reason for the Commission even
to know of the grand jury's existence.357 Conversely, a Freedom of In-
formation Act request for Watergate documents was denied in another
case because the request specifically sought information presented to a
grand jury.3 58 In Senate of Puerto Rico v. Department of Justice,359 the
court upheld a Freedom Of Information Act request that asked for all
documents on a certain subject in Department of Justice files, including
but not limited to materials presented to a grand jury.360 The court rea-
soned that the Department could have released all the documents re-
quested without further identifying their source, and the requester would
have been unable "to determine which documents had been submitted to
the grand jury. '36 1
Senate of Puerto Rico has direct application to witness preparation
355. See id. at 1613.
356. See id. at 1647; supra section II(B)(5).
357. See SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382-83 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 993 (1980); see also United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 983 (1979) (allowing disclosures that revealed nothing about a grand jury investigation to
persons with a legitimate interest in the documents); United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, 280
F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960) (allowing disclosure of data sought "for its intrinsic value in the further-
ance of a lawful investigation ... rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury").
358. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Record Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869-
70 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
359. 823 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
360. See id. at 582-83, 589.
361. Id. at 583.
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involving the use of a collection of discoverable documents. It makes
sense to protect the privacy of the collection in a way that retains access
to the underlying documents. It is one thing to ask a witness what hap-
pened at a particular board meeting; it is quite another to ask what the
witness and counsel discussed about the meeting. 362 The opposing party
can have full access to the underlying information through substantive
discovery, but the burden remains on the questioner to select topics and
documents to ask about. The request for the collection itself, in contrast,
is like the request for grand jury materials per se-it treads in a protected
area and serves only to reveal protected information.
This arrangement affords a significant degree of privacy to the
preparer. Even if the questioner is permitted to ask whether the witness
reviewed a particular document prior to testifying, answers to that ques-
tion would not necessarily reveal whether the document was presented to
the witness by counsel. Moreover, if preparation was at all extensive, the
witness is unlikely to remember completely or accurately which docu-
ments were discussed with counsel.363 The main purpose for asking for
an "official list" of documents reviewed with a witness is to obtain a
complete and accurate picture of the matters deemed significant by the
witness's preparer. The questioner hopes in this way to infer the oppo-
nent's evaluation of the significant points in the case and perhaps the
opponent's lines of proof and argument. Unless the picture obtained is
certain and complete, it is not much more useful than the questioner's
own evaluation of the case. Therefore, identifying the documents relied
upon piecemeal through the witness's recollection is highly unsatisfac-
tory to the opponent; in addition, it preserves the secrecy of the
preparer's strategy.
Protecting the privacy of witness preparation obviously encourages
preparation and advances the partisan aspects of the adversary system.
Access to the underlying documents serves the accuracy goals of the sys-
tem. An opposing lawyer who identifies the important issues in the case
can use specific questions to discover what the witness has consulted. In
the context of grand jury materials, the individual documents' availabil-
ity from other sources is decisive: "The civil lawyer's need [for grand
jury materials] is ordinarily nothing more than a matter of saving time
and expense .... We have consistently rejected the argument that such
362. Similarly, the attorney-client privilege permits the first question, which requests underlying
facts, but not the second, which requests the communication between client and attorney. See
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
363. Cf. Vogel, supra note 101, at 397 (asserting that a witness will recall, if asked, "that ques-
tions were asked rather than statements made").
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savings can justify a breach of grand jury secrecy. '364 Similarly, as long
as the opposing lawyer has the ability to obtain individual documents
and cross-examine the witness about them, there is no compelling need to
breach the work-product protection.
B. Expert Witnesses
The competing goals of the adversary system dictate a different re-
sult for an expert who will testify at trial.365 The preparation activity at
issue in Berkey was providing background information to expert wit-
nesses. 366 Berkey involves written information, but the analysis that fol-
lows applies equally to oral communications.
For unexplained reasons, the Berkey court did not even consider the
discovery rules that apply to experts. Instead, it relied on Federal Rule
of Evidence 612, which applies to witnesses generally. 367 The equities of
the case demanded disclosure, but the liberal use of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 705 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), which apply
directly to experts, would have allowed this disclosure.
Preparation of expert witnesses should be treated differently from
preparation of other witnesses. Subtle distortion of the testimony by pre-
trial coaching is to a large extent a nonissue: the expert is and can be
easily depicted on cross as an advocate. 368 In the expert-witness context,
the structural needs of the adversary system are more important. Sub-
stantive cross-examination requires access to the facts and data that form
the basis for the expert's opinion. Because the expert, like the tribunal, is
naive and must be "programmed" with the facts of the individual case,
the expert's conclusions are only valid, or even meaningful, in the context
of the input.369 It is hardly unreasonable, therefore, to require that the
364. United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 431 (1983).
365. As this Article has pointed out, see supra notes 85, 89, experts may have a variety of roles in
litigation. Some differences are legally significant, and some are not. See id. Berkey represents one
of the most common (and straightforward) uses of experts, but it does not represent all such uses.
Accordingly, experts with more complex relationships to the sponsoring party-for example, in-
house experts-may have to be treated differently.
366. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Frankel, J.).
367. See id. at 616-17. Given his general views on witness preparation, Judge Frankel was prob-
ably anxious to reach for the more general proposition that would open up witness preparation to
greater scrutiny. The subsequent retreat from the Berkey position, see supra section II(B)(6), sug-
gests the value of confining Berkey's broad holding to the expert setting.
368. This perception of the expert as an advocate is presumably the reason that the Third Circuit
found that discovery of core work product would not affect the expert's credibility. See Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the "marginal value" of disclosure of
attorney-expert communications allowed disclosure). Because it is generally recognized that the
lawyer explains to the expert more or less exactly what needs to be said, the communications reflect-
ing this explanation have no bearing on the plausibility of the expert's opinion.
369. The requirement for hypothetical questions to experts-which was in place before enact-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence-was a reflection of this philosophy. The jury was able in
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expert, like the tribunal, render opinions on a definite record. The more
we accept the idea that scientific conclusions are not inevitable, the more
important it is to know precisely how experts reach their conclusions-
only then can opponents effectively challenge them.370 Moreover, the
expert's very lack of personal knowledge makes it relatively easy to re-
construct, to an extent impossible with a lay witness, the universe of case-
specific facts upon which the expert is relying.
Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence require only disclosure
of factual material provided to the expert during cross-examination,
many courts require early disclosure to permit a thorough, orderly, and
efficient examination. 371 This disclosure typically begins with interroga-
tories and document requests. Based on the interrogatory answers and
documents, the opposing lawyer then deposes the expert, also exploring
any foundational material that has been communicated orally. 372 Disclo-
sure under these terms poses no threat to the partisan nature of the ad-
versary system. The essential work product-strategy and lines of
proof-is already revealed in interrogatories covering the expert's iden-
tity, the subject of the proposed testimony, and the opinions that will be
rendered. The rest involves factual foundation, disclosure of which is
essential to effective cross-examination. Whatever its faults, cross-exami-
nation is the main tool for achieving the accuracy goals of the advocacy
system. Accordingly, there is no sound reason to protect factual infor-
mation provided to testifying experts from early and complete
disclosure.373
C. Group Preparation of Witnesses
The final application involves the hardest issue, collusive witness
preparation. In United States v. Ebens, the government prosecuted Ron-
ald Ebens and Michael Nitz for violating the civil rights of Vincent Chin,
theory to see each and every factual assumption upon which the expert based the conclusion and
then compare the assumptions to its findings of the actual facts of the case. See supra section
II(B)(4).
370. See Gay v. P.K. Lindsay Co., 666 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982) (rejecting application of both rules 612 and 705 because no reliance by the expert had been
demonstrated).
371. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) does not protect from disclosure mater-
ials provided to the expert by the sponsoring party).
372. See Shulman, supra note 284, at 521-22.
373. See Committee on Product Liability, Discovery of Expert Witnesses under Federal Rule 26,
44 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 534 (1989) (recommending
amendment of rule 26(b)(4) to permit discovery of expert witness by deposition as of right); see also
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part
Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 200 (proposing an amendment to
permit discovery of all materials provided to a testifying expert).
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a Chicago man who had been brutally murdered allegedly because of his
Chinese ancestry. For their roles in the murder, Ebens and Nitz had
received what many perceived to be unreasonably light sentences in state
court. The civil rights prosecution followed the resulting public outcry.
One of the most active proponents of federal action was lawyer Lisa
Chan.
Chan was neither a prosecutor nor was she formally connected with
the litigation. Nevertheless, she met with three of the main prosecution
witnesses-Robert Sirosky, Gary Koivu, and Jimmy Choi-friends of
Chin who had been with him at various times on the night of the murder.
She explained to the witnesses that they were meeting "to help each other
remember exactly what happened, how it happened, when it happened
and all the minor details. ' '374 Chan also sought to reconcile the versions
of Sirosky, Koivu, and Choi with the statements of other witnesses.
The issues discussed were, among other things, whether the defend-
ants had directed ethnic slurs at Chin.375 Koivu and Sirosky recalled
having heard Ebens and Nitz use racially inflammatory language, but
Choi initially did not. The meeting was tape recorded, and the defend-
ants sought to introduce the transcript of the meeting to impeach the
witnesses by showing that they had been coached. The court of appeals
held that the trial court's refusal to permit the defendants to use the tran-
script was reversible error.
Ebens is an unusual case because, apart from involving particularly
unsubtle group preparation, (1) the preparation session was conducted by
a lawyer who, representing none of the parties, had no claim of privilege,
and (2) a tape recording of the session was extant. To make the example
more representative of actual practice, let us suppose that Ebens had
been a civil action in which (1) Chan represented all three witnesses, and
(2) the session was not recorded. If Choi testified truthfully at trial that
he heard ethnic slurs, the statements made at the meeting with Chan,
while of great importance to the defense, would have been absolutely
protected by the attorney-client and work-product privileges. 376 Within
the adversary structure, Chan was well within her rights to inform her
374. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1431 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986). The court reprinted sub-
stantial portions of the transcript of Chan's meeting with the witnesses as an appendix to its opinion.
Id. at 1442-45.
375. This fact is highly significant, because the prosecution had to be able to prove that the
defendants were motivated by ethnic or racial animus. See id. at 1429.
376. The transcript in Ebens, whatever its impeachment value to the defendants, does not
demonstrate that either Chan or the witnesses intended to present false testimony to the court. Ac-
cordingly, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege would not have provided
grounds for disclosure of the substance of the meeting, had the attorney-client privilege applied in
the first place. See United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1975).
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clients of the expected testimony of others and to encourage them to re-
flect on the accuracy and certainty of their memories.
But group preparation poses extraordinary dangers of collusion, in-
fluence, and fabrication. 377 Accordingly, the defendants should have
been permitted to ask each witness whether he discussed the substance of
his testimony in the presence of other witnesses, when the discussions
occurred, which subjects were discussed, and who was present, regardless
of the presence of counsel at such meetings. The substance of the conver-
sations with counsel would have remained privileged, but the courts'
usual reluctance to permit questioning on the subject matter of discus-
sions between lawyers and clients378 would give way.
This outcome is a compromise. Truth seeking is thwarted because
the defendants do not learn of Choi's initial failure to recall ethnic slurs.
Partisan representation is thwarted because the secrecy of Chan's prepa-
ration is breached-the mere occurrence of such meetings will be damag-
ing to Choi's credibility in the eyes of the jury.37 9  On the other hand,
the defendants obtain a limited impeachment tool, and Chan has the op-
portunity to resurrect Choi's memory on an important point. In a single
case, this resolution may be no more than an expedient compromise of
conflicting interests. In the long run, however, required disclosure of
group meetings of witnesses would be a strong disincentive to such be-
havior. Like oral description of documents and secret data provided to
experts, group preparation does not represent an equilibrium between
partisanship and accuracy, but instead the triumph of partisanship. Any
resolution of the witness-preparation problem must restore that balance.
377. Concededly, a well-executed hub-and-spoke arrangement in which the lawyer coordinated
testimony through meetings with one client at a time could have similar deleterious effects. See
United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Diversified Indus. v. Mere-
dith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978)). Hub-and-spoke consultations should be excluded from this
disclosure rule, however, on practical grounds. First, such arrangements are very time-consuming,
especially if many issues and perspectives are involved. Second, the lack of direct conversation
among the witnesses is likely to lead to adoption of an ill-fitting story that will be more vulnerable to
cross-examination, if not impeachment. Third, it is unwise to start down the road of required disclo-
sure of one-on-one meetings between lawyers and clients, because it would intrude into entirely
legitimate conferences. Group preparation provides a relatively clear, albeit imperfect, line of
demarcation.
378. See, e.g., Phoenix Nat'l Corp. v. Bowater United Kingdom Paper Ltd., 98 F.R.D. 669, 671
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (finding that rule 26(b)(3) governs even though the movant did not seek discovery
of "documents or tangible things"); Ford v. Philips Elecs. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 361
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (establishing guidelines for questioning a witness); Bercow v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 39 F.R.D. 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (refusing to compel witness to reveal person with whom he
had discussed the deposition).
379. See Vogel, supra note 101, at 398 (recommending that "if it should appear that all of the
witnesses have met at a single time with counsel, the impression is left that they all got together and
arranged a story").
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V. Conclusion
This Article has identified the place witness preparation occupies in
the American judicial system and the difficulties it poses for the adminis-
tration of justice. As a practical matter, witness preparation is a univer-
sal practice, despite the pervasive uncertainty in the legal rules that apply
to it. The uncertainty is the result of the ambivalent doctrinal basis for
witness preparation: the adversary system encourages the practice but
simultaneously seeks to remedy its effects. The ambivalence, in turn, can
be traced to the adversary system's competing goals of accuracy and par-
tisan representation.
Witness preparation is not harmless.. It provides opportunities for
lawyers to encourage witnesses to adopt convenient, if not necessarily
accurate, testimony. Even with the most honorable intentions, prepara-
tion may result in the distortion of witnesses' recollections. But witness
preparation is integral to the lawyer's role in a judicial system that de-
pends on partisan case development. Some preparatory activities are es-
sential to a coherent and reasonably accurate factual presentation. More
intensive preparation is required if the partisan advocate is to fulfill the
ultimate responsibility to the client-presenting a persuasive case. This
conflict cannot be resolved with one or a few doctrinal rules. Instead,
each case requires thoughtful consideration of the precise nature of the
witness preparation involved and of its relationship to adversarial justice.
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